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The Soviet Offensive i n Europe The Schlieffen Plan Revisited? Richard Ned Lebow o v e r the years a substantial literature has developed about the conventional military balance in Europe and the respective strategies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A certain asymmetry exists in this literature. NATO strategy has always been controversial ; students of the subject concur in its content but disagree as to its wisdom. Many critics contend that a Soviet conventional offensive would probably succeed in its objective, generally assumed to be the destruction of NATO forces behind the Rhine River line.’ Studies abound that propose a The author wishes to acknowledge the support he received from the German Marshall Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation, which permitted him to work out the ideas for this article at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio and to discuss them there with Robert Jervis and Gert Krell. Useful assistance was subsequently provided by Matthew Evangelista, Michael MccGwire, Craig Nation, Edward Rhodes, Myron Rush, and Jack Snyder. This article is part of a book-length study, Away from the Abyss: Managing Superpower Strategic Relations, to be published in January 1986 by Cornell University Press. Richard Ned Lebow is Professor of Government and Director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. 1. The 1950s conventional wisdom was that NATO could be overwhelmed in a matter of days. Matthew A. Evangelista, ”Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 11C-138, has demonstrated that this judgement was based on a distorted assessment of Soviet military power. Western views of the balance did not begin to change until the late 1960s, when a more realistic view of Pact capabilities began to emerge. Thomas W. Wolfe’s Soviet Power and Europe, 2945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), was particularly influential in this regard. Some authorities, among them, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), contended that a successful conventional defense of Europe was now possible and that NATO’s most glaring deficiencies could be corrected at relatively little cost. This assessment was challenged not only by the traditionalists but by younger defense analysts. Steven L. Canby, NATO Military Policy, Rand Report R-1088-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1973), and The Alliance and Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology, Adelphi Paper No. 109(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1974-75), and Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), argued that NATO would be unable to halt a Pact offensive because of its static defensive strategy, slow reinforcement rate, and relative lack of logistical and equipment standardization. A good review of this early literature is provided by Robert Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces, Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976). The 1970s witnessed across-the-board improvements in Pact firepower, mobility, and command and control. This led some criticsof NATO strategy to assert that Sovietled forces could overwhelm NATO without proper reinforcement. The threat of a ”standing start” attack was publicized by Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New International Security, Spring 1985 (Vol. 9, No. 4) 0162-28891851040044-35$02.5010 0 1985by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 44 Soviet Offensive in Europe I 45 variety of military “fixes”or even alternative strategies for European security. In recent years the subject has become something of a cottage industry.2 Soviet Threat, U.S. Senate, Armed ServicesCommittee, 95th Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). It was also the principle theme of Phillip A. Karber, The Impact of New Conventional Technologies on Military Doctrine and Organization in the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Paper No. 144(London: International Institute for StrategicStudies, Spring 1978). Within the government, a recent CIA report has rekindled the current administration’s interest in the problem. See the Washington Times, July 26, 1984, p. 1. The most cogent critique of this scenario remains Les Aspin, “A Surprise Attack on NATO: Refocusing the Debate...

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