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and the Balance ofI World Power I T h e question ”what causes alignment?” is a central issue in debates on American foreign policy, and the choices that are made often turn on which hypotheses of alliance formation are endorsed. In general, those who believe that American security is fragile most often assume that Soviet allies are reliable and America’s are prone to defect, while those who believe it is robust tend to view American allies as stronger and more reliable than those of the U.S.S.R. These divergent beliefs clash over a variety of specific issues. For example, should the U.S. increase its commitment to NATO, to prevent the growth of Soviet military power from leading to the “Finlandization” of Europe? Alternatively, should the U.S. do less in the expectation that its allies will do more? Should the U.S. oppose leftist regimes in the developing world because their domestic ideology will lead them to ally with the Soviet Union, or can a policy of accommodating radical nationalist regimes lead to good relations with them? Can Soviet or American military aid create reliable proxies in the Third World? Is it worth the effort and expense? Each of these questions carries important implications for American national security policy, and the answers ultimately turn upon which hypotheses of alliance formation are believed to be most valid. Despite the obvious importance of understanding how states select their partners, most scholarly research on alliances has ignored or obscured these questions.’ This article is intended to correct these omissions by outlining I would like to thank Robert Art, George Breslauer, Lynn Eden, Charles Glaser, Lori Gronich, Fen Hampson, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Oye, Glenn Snyder, Jack Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg , and Kenneth Waltz for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Stephen M . Walt is an Assistant Professor of Politics and lnternational Affairs in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. 1. For representative examples of typical scholarly efforts, consult: Robert Rood and Patrick McGowan, “Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 1975); George T. Duncan and Randolph Siverson, “Flexibility of Alliance Partner Choice in Multipolar Systems,” Znternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1982);R.P.Y. Li and W.R. Thompson, “The Stochastic Process of Alliance Formation Behavior,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (December 1978). More traditional Znternational Security, Spring 1985 (Vol. 9, No. 4) 0162-28891851040003-41 $02.5010 0 1985 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. International Security I 4 some of the most important hypotheses of alliance formation, and by exploring the policy implications of each. The first section explores the competing propositions that states either balance against strong or threatening states or, alternatively, that they “bandwagon” with them. I shall also consider the sharply different foreign and defense policies that each proposition implies. The second section develops the contrasting hypotheses that ideological or cultural similarities can either bind states together or drive them apart. The third section examinesthe abilityof states to create allies or proxies by military and economic aid, propaganda, or political penetration. Finally, the last section demonstrates how these hypotheses, taken together, can explain the current structure of world power, and suggests what they imply for American national security policy. Balancing Versus Bandwagoning: Alliances as a Response to Threat Alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will be. When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat).2 These contrasting hypotheses depict very different worlds, and the policies that follow from each are equally distinct. In the simplest terms, if balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies. But if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is rewarded. A more belligerent foreign...

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