The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications

The Sources o f American Conduct Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications IA new way of thinking and talking about Soviet foreign policy is needed, one that allows ready recognition of diversity in the outward behavior of a society whose leaders are bent on the containment of diversity within. The experience of the liberal democracies demonstrates that a dual policy of concurrent resistance and cooperation in dealing with the U.S.S.R. suffers in the absence of public recognition of dualism in Soviet conduct. But how to contest the widespread assumption that the Soviet leaders are singleminded expansionists without falling into the other error of implying that the regime is divided into coalitions of moderates and diehards whose presence cannot be demonstrated with assurance? The answer is to be had in the identification of contrasting tendencies in the behavior of the Soviet Union that persist irrespective of momentary internal configurations of the regime. Western analysts have debated the sources of Soviet foreign conduct for many years now. The effort to define and explain the opponent’s behavior, sometimes referred to simply as ”the threat,” has seen the emergence of three main schools of thought which continue to vie for acceptance.’ This article seeks to promote a new synthesis suited to the needs of Western policy in the latter half of the 1980s and beyond. Some would explain Soviet conduct primarily by reference to what the U.S.S.R. is or is supposed to be-a totalitarian political order that is irrevocably committed to world domination, that stays its hand only when confronted with superior force, and that invariably exploits Western good will in the furtherance of its aggressive aims. President Reagan’s vision of the Soviet Union as an empire of evil is not far removed from this eccentric evaluation. It is however far removed from the data of Soviet behavior, as will be seen. A more empirical assessment is associated with mainstream Western thinking about the containment of Soviet power. For this school of thought, the explanation of Soviet actions centers more on what the Kremlin does and less on what the Soviet system “is.” A wider range of Soviet responses to Western moves is in principle allowed, mainly because the Soviet leaders are viewed not only as ideological thinkers but as realists who accommodate when forced to do so. Indeed, the elements of a tendency analysis lie buried in the foundations of Western thinking about containment: as Franklyn Griffiths is Professor of Political Science and Acting Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. 1. See the penetrating accounts in William Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970)and WilliamZimmerman, “Rethinking Soviet Foreign Policy: Changing American Perspectives,” International Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 1980),pp. 54% 562. Zimmerman especially is relied upon here. International Security, Fall 1984 (Vol. 9, No. 2) 0162-2889/84/020003-48 $02.5011 0 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3 International Security 14 George F. Kennan put it in 1947, the "expansive tendencies" in Soviet policy were accompanied by "tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."2 An overriding preoccupation with Soviet expansionism and with the mechanics of countervailing force has, however , served to inhibit the emergence of a comprehensive understanding of Soviet tendencies and how they might figure in a more balanced Western approach to the U.S.S.R. Both schools of thought-they have been called "essentialist" and "mechanist" respectively-have relied heavily on strategic conceptions in accounting for Soviet behavior. In common with more conservative Soviet assessments of the politics of American policymaking, to be considered below, i t is felt that the opponent is best understood in terms of its ability to implement a strategy, or even "plan," devised by a small group of individuals at the pinnacle of the political system. This readiness to attribute a high level of centralization, intentionality, and self-controlin the making of Soviet policies has been challenged by a growing body of research...