Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (review)

Insurgency and terrorism, Ian Beckett informs us, have since 1945 become "the most prevalent forms of conflict," so that it is all the more surprising that both they and the methods used to counter them have attracted so little attention from historians. As a contribution to the remedying of this deficiency he has contributed a quite masterly survey introduction to the excellent Warfare and History series published by Routledge. Beckett's considerable expertise is put to good use in chapters on the roots of insurgency and of counter-insurgency, on resistance during the Second World War, and too much on Mao and revolutionary warfare, and four chapters on developments since 1945. The range of conflicts discussed is impressive: from the American Revolution to the Vendée, from American Confederate guerrillas to the contemporary IRA, from the Philippines to Southern Rhodesia and so on. Beckett's knowledge is extensive and his judgements command respect. In his discussion of American operations against the Filipino rebels at the end of the 1890s, for example, he quite correctly rejects accusations of genocide, but nevertheless insists that "there were still 117 verifiable atrocities against Filipinos between 1898 and 1902."

There are, of course, problems with this sort of general account. One particular problem here is that too often Beckett does not provide enough political context for the conflicts he examines. This is compounded by the fact that he does not emphasise the importance of politics enough and the extent of their bearing on the origins, conduct and outcome of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. The Irish War of Independence is a good example. Beckett argues that the reason for the success of the IRA campaign was "the lack of political direction on the British side." This treats politics like an ingredient when it can be better regarded as the recipe. It was, in fact, the political complexities of the Irish War that put the British Army and the Royal Irish Constabulary in an almost impossible position. They were charged with enforcing a political policy that was not compatible with military methods. Lloyd George's coalition government was committed to a Home Rule settlement in Ireland even though after 1918 it was clear that this was no longer acceptable to a majority of the Irish people. The domination of the coalition by Conservatives, many of whom were not even sympathetic to Home Rule, prevented Lloyd George from offering further concessions which would have split Sinn Féin, isolated the hardline republicans, and probably have avoided war altogether. Instead, the British found themselves in the impossible position of trying to impose Home Rule, that is a particular system of self-government, by force. British methods successfully alienated Irish opinion and strengthened the republican hardliners but were never adequate to the reconquest of Ireland. Such a reconquest was technically possible but it would have negated the political objective. Instead, the conflict was fought to a stalemate with some hundreds dead before the position of the Conservatives had been undermined enough for Lloyd George to gain room for manoeuvre. The result was the Free State.

Clearly politics was the very fabric of the conflict and cannot be treated as merely an ingredient. This leads to a general conclusion and it is here that Beckett can be faulted. Obviously, a general introduction and survey is not the place to explore the political complexities of every conflict discussed, but more should have been done to alert the reader to the crucial significance of this dimension of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Having said this, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies is a work of considerable merit. Every library should have a copy.