The Battle of Normandy 1944 (review)

Arguments about the conduct of the Normandy campaign began while it was going on—most notably in Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder's relentless criticism of Montgomery's handling of the battle. That discussion went public shortly after the war's end, with a book by Eisenhower's former aide Harry Butcher (1946), followed by Chester Wilmot's enormously influential The Struggle for Europe (1948). It is still going on, with Robin Neillands's book one of the most recent entries. Neillands is a prolific writer of very readable military history for the general public, who are the target audience for this book. His aim is "to be even handed about the Normandy campaign"(p. 24). Specialist historians—and most of the readers of this journal will qualify—will find no new archival evidence, nor detailed monographic dissection of either the campaign or its most controversial episodes, like "Goodwood" and the (non)closure of the Falaise pocket. The question for readers of JMH would, therefore, seem to be: can this book be commended as introductory reading either to a curious undergraduate or to what libraries call general readership? Does the author deliver on his promise of a balanced account, based on existing secondary sources (albeit enlivened by veterans' memories—some of them set down at a rather late date)? This reviewer's answer is yes—with a few caveats. Neillands writes clearly and there are enough sketch maps to orient the general reader. His opinions on many issues seem perfectly reasonable. "Normandy was an Allied battle and the victory was an Allied victory" (p. 404) might seem almost a truism but for the erosion of the Anglo-Canadian role in some recent accounts of the campaign, a development that seems to have motivated the writing of this book. At the center of many of the arguments about the Normandy campaign is the still (and perhaps forever) controversial figure of Bernard Law Montgomery. Here again, Neillands seems on target: Monty was a badly flawed human being, but a competent general, and—as A. J. P. Taylor suggested nearly forty years ago—needs to be judged by the results he produced as a general. One of the questions raised, repeatedly, by that approach is the nature and quality of the force Monty commanded, especially the British Second Army. Neillands seems to accept that the "tired army" thesis has some validity, but rejects vigorously the argument that British and Canadian units bore less than their fair share of both combat and casualties. There is more than a hint of (understandable) anger in his treatment of this issue. His conclusion—"in real terms there is nothing much to choose between the performance of the various Allied armies in Normandy"—seems fair and well argued.

One of the caveats mentioned above is that the non-specialist reader of this book probably ought also to read Carlo D'Este's Decision in Normandy, if only to understand what Neillands is reacting against. There are also several issues not addressed. Chester Wilmot's book was read by far more people than ever looked at the official histories, and it certainly reflected Monty's views. Its role in stoking the Anglo-American war of words over Normandy really needs to be weighed carefully in any account of that controversy. Finally, once again Normandy has been discussed without any serious consideration of the role of the Second Army commander, Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey. The late Ronald Lewin always claimed that the Normandy story would be incomplete until there was a serious study of Dempsey. Neillands's narrative seems to underscore the validity of that point without probing Dempsey's role—but doubtless more Normandy books are already taking shape.