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The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17.2 (2003) 136-138



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John Dewey's Liberalism: Individual, Community, and Self-Development.Daniel M. Savage. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002. Pp. 219. $40.00 h.c. 0-8093-2410-5.

John Dewey's Liberalism tries to bridge the gap between liberal and communitarian approaches to political philosophy. Daniel Savage characterizes communitarians as giving priority to "the good," while liberals prioritize "the right." Communitarians, Savage claims, view rights as means to achieve various social goods and find objectionable the notion of presocial rights. Liberals value autonomy; they claim that individuals ought to be able to choose their own conception of the good. Liberals fear most a society that imposes its conception of the good life on unwilling individuals.

Stated in this way, the disagreement appears irresolvable. Following in the neo-liberal tradition of William Galston and Bruce Ackerman, however, Savage tries to dissolve this debate. He argues that John Dewey's reconstruction of the notion of autonomy is communitarian "because it consists of virtues that are a product of personal effort within a context of shared beliefs. Because these liberal virtues—critical reflection, creative individuality, and sociability—are both the means to and partially constitutive of the good life, they can be used by Dewey to establish a communitarian form of liberal society" (177). Savage discusses these liberal virtues extensively, characterizing them as means between extremes of vice. For example, the virtue of critical reflection is a mean between the extremes of dogmatism and moral skepticism. He argues that because these liberal virtues are means to achieve social and personal goods, Dewey's account of autonomy is communitarian.

In his third chapter, Savage compares liberal virtues to traits associated with artistic creativity. Successful artists, like successful citizens, navigate between a conformist objectifying classicism and an eccentric, subjective romanticism. As Savage puts it, "Creativity (the common denominator of art and individuality) is the synthesis, or interaction, of subjectivity (the unique perspective of the individual) and objectivity (the existentially real natural and social environment)" (63). Unlike neutralist liberals, Dewey situates the creative individual within a cultural context; innovation occurs within this meaningful social context. Communitarian philosophers and classical artists often discount the importance of innovation. Liberal philosophers and romantic artists often overlook the social context. Dewey's account of imaginative reconstruction negotiates between these two extremes.

In order to show that Dewey is not simply a communitarian, Savage argues transcendentally that Dewey's liberal virtues are necessary conditions for the possibility of future growth. Because of this, autonomy is a necessary element [End Page 136] in the good life itself. Savage writes, "Although Dewey offered a practical method of moral reasoning that transcends any particular context, he understood that the material his autonomous chooser must work with differs from one cultural context to the next" (30). While particular communities develop their own conceptions of the good life, the only satisfactory method for moral reasoning involves the liberal virtues. This ensures that autonomy and its virtues are the only goods necessarily constitutive of any community's conception of the good life.

Savage's transcendental argument rests on his claim that the liberal virtues are necessary preconditions for growth. He does not seriously consider alternatives. In addressing Dewey's critics such as Walter Lippmann and C. Wright Mills, Savage repeats Dewey's convictions about liberal values and claims that the critic's realism does not allow for melioristic change. But he never addresses the central issue: the evidence that the liberal virtues are necessary preconditions for achieving other goods. John Patrick Diggins raises this issue in a recent article, writing, "Curiously, there are only two entities in the world that have eliminated racism: Castro's Cuba and the U.S. Armed forces. Both are authoritarian, militaristic and anti-gay. Democracy and socialism have had sufficient opportunity to overcome racism. The record is not very encouraging" (Diggins, 1998, 228). While one can disagree with Diggins, Savage does not even consider such criticisms of the liberal virtues, and his transcendental argument is weakened because...

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