Strategic Engagement and Sino-American Trade

STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT AND SINO-AMERICAN TRADE Frederic Davidson I would like to envision a China that could eventually be a legitimate ally ofthe free world. I think there has to be a certain degree of caution, remembering that this is a country whose government subscribes to an ideology based on a belief in destroying governments like ours . . . but I am also going to keep in mind that I do not want to go so fast that some day weapons we might have provided will be shooting at us. Ronald Reagan T1he issue of selling military hardware, weapons, and dual-use technology to the People's Republic ofChina (PRC), and the degree to which a bilateral security relationship is established between the two former adversaries will probably be among the most important foreign policy questions to confront the Reagan administration. The emphasis on the "China differential" through the tilt toward China in technology transfer and export control policy since the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan in December 1979 has drawn attention to recent bilateral discussions with the Chinese over strategic and geopolitical issues. Moreover, it has raised questions about the dimensions ofSino-American relations and their implications for the course and direction of the triangular relationship between the United States, the People's Republic ofChina, and the Soviet Union. Frederic Davidson specializes in East-West trade policy with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. He has also held posts in the Department of Commerce and the Congressional Research Service ofthe Library ofCongress. The views expressed in this article are entirely those ofthe authorand are not intended to reflect those ofthe U.S. government or the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative. 131 132 SAIS REVIEW In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 10, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., acknowledged the volatility of this ménage à trois: . . . the challenge ofthis decade . . . is the necessity, on the one hand, to conduct our policies in such a way that the People's Republic ofChina recognizes that there is some value in a normalization of relations with the United States . . . and . . . not permit this normalizationprocess to result in a situation that my European friends describe as poking sticks in the polar bear's cage. . . . Our relationships with China . . . should be based on our strategic motivations for that relationship. And we must not getourselves into a triangle relationship which constantly serves as an irritant to improving East-West relationships. Secretary Haig is "actively conscious" that nearly one-fourth of Soviet troops are stationed along China's borders, and he "would dread the consequences of the relief of Moscow's concern there." He has contended that the United States can concurrently "enjoy the benefits of multipolarity by very hardnosed benefits ofthe international behavior, day by day, of those two communist nations as we develop our policies toward each." Ever since the Nixon administration initiated the normalization process with the PRC, successive administrations have used export control policy as a component of the evolving Sino-American rapprochement and retreat from détente with the USSR. As the worldwide geopolitical situation has brought U.S. and Chinese "parallel interests" into focus, export control policy has been manipulated to satisfy China's appetite for Western technology and to punish the Soviet Union for their forays into Afghanistan and Africa. Over the last decade, the United States and PRC have developed a convergence of views on various strategic and diplomatic issues, especially those that relate to Soviet attempts to achieve hegemony in Asia. These "parallel interests" include support of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, backing for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and opposition to Vietnamese domination over Southeast Asia. There are areas, however, in which American and Chinese positions diverge, including Taiwan, South Korea, the Middle East, and arms control. Strategic concerns about the Soviet Union have been at the center of the U.S.-PRC rapprochement. As long ago as the early 1940s, China exhibited an interest in pursuing such a rapprochement. At that time, its feelers were rejected by the United States, which regarded the Chinese as a serious threat to American political and...