Theater Nuclear Forces: Europe's New Maginot Line

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES: _ EUROPE'S NEW MAGINOT LINE Myra Struck . . . this monopoly ofthe [nuclear] weapon created a mentality akin to that engendered in the French by the Maginot Line before 1939; it encouraged a false sense of security, distracted attention from the urgency ofsolving certain basic political and social problems. Adam Ulam1 W, ith the approval of Military Committee document 48 at the December 1954 ministerial session, the NATO Council officially adopted a strategy ofrelying upon nuclear weapons for the defense ofEurope. This move brought NATO's strategy into line with that ofthe United States, as developed by the Eisenhower administration. As an extension of Eisenhower's New Look, MC 48 reflected the debate over the role of theater nuclear forces (TNF), which had been carried on essentially since the end of World War II. The debate has continued and NATO strategy has changed in response to changing circumstances, but official NATO doctrine to this day reflects the 1954 decision. While the rationale and doctrine have become much more sophisticated, NATO has not renounced a strategy of first-use of nuclear weapons. The reason for this is as obvious today as it was in 1954: Because of its inability to field a sufficient conventional force, NATO must rely upon nuclear weapons. A conventional force has been and remains very expensive in terms ofmanpower, equipment, and support. Neither expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 413. Myra Struck received the M.A. degree from SAIS in May 1981. She has served as an intern with the International Security Programs/Regional Division of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 113 114 SAIS REVIEW the United States nor NATO has been willing, in 1954 or 1981, to pay the political and economic costs of a conventional force to equal that of the Warsaw Pact. Eisenhower's answer was to bolster a moderate U. S. presence in Europe with theater nuclear forces, strengthening both NATO and the linkage between European defense and American strategic forces. The problem of European defense cannot be so easily answered today. Theater nuclear forces are no longer the simple solution they appeared to be in the 1950s and early 1960s. The development by the USSR of an impressive TNF capability of its own has led the newly self-confident European powers to publicly question the desirability and implications of theater nuclear forces in Europe, and ultimately to express doubt as to their willingness to allow these American weapons on their soil. The dual nature of NATO's December 1979 decision to modernize long-range TNF by deploying the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles highlights the degree to which these concerns have complicated NATO force planning. For the first time, a key force decision was tied directly to progress in arms control as a condition for allied acceptance oflong-range TNF deployment. The hope is that the current imbalance offorces caused by the Soviet deployment ofthe SS-20 mobile missile can be redressed through a reduction in these weapons, rather than by an offsetting buildup in comparable U.S. weapons. Whether one feels that is possible or not, the United States is obliged to attempt it in the near future. The issues to be addressed in TNF negotiations are many and complex; the potential for failure or stalemate and stagnation is enormous. The first and perhaps most difficult issue will be an agreement on which weapons are in fact to be classified as TNF. This requirement to negotiate now on TNF may be a blessing in disguise for those concerned with fashioning the best possible defense posture for Europe despite political and economic obstacles. The opportunity exists to undertake a thorough and honest réévaluation of the role of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. As the Reagan administration hashes out a negotiating position, it may conclude that the original premises upon which European TNF deployment was based, in particular the overwhelming U.S. superiority in all types ofnuclear weapons, are no longer valid; that NATO's TNF-dependent force posture has resulted in dangerous deficiencies and makes impossible a renouncement of first-use of nuclear weapons. If these conclusions are reached, the current administration must answer...