Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Revival (review)

236 SAIS REVIEW more independent figure on the international stage. This leads in turn to further surprising recommendations. For example, Clarkson argues that, given the Reagan administration's changes in strategic policy, Canada should withdraw from its "juniorpartner role" in the strategic defense of North America. Instead, Canada should augment its conventional contribution to NATO. This would place Canada in the European camp, through which it would have more "clout" in Washington, possibly even playing a leadership role "on the most dangerous issue in the world by not following one of its most dangerous governments." Even ignoring Clarkson's melodramatic description ofcurrent efforts to improve the U.S. strategic posture, his suggestion for a bold, independent Canadian response to those efforts is difficult to understand. Conventional deterrence in Europe is, after all, preeminently an American policy, pushed onto the Europeans over their objections. It is integral to the total American strategic posture, nuclear as well as conventional, and nothing would please Washington more than to have Canada increase its present contributions. As for any additional "clout" that this would give Ottawa in this field, it seems highly unlikely that the Germans or the British need or want Canadian leadership on matters directly affecting their security and the delicate relationship between that security and American strategic imperatives. These, and other questionable recommendations found in this book, suggest that Clarkson wrote for a particular segment of his Canadian audience. It is that part of the informed Canadian public which is predisposed, almost eager, to believe the worst about American policy toward Canada—a group, moreover, that is determined on principle to have Canada place as much distance as it can between itself and the United States. It is important for Americans to recognize the existence of this group in order to better understand Canada. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should be aware that most Canadians, especially those in private and public positions of responsibility, would reject much of Clarkson's "American strategy." They are concerned about the issues outlined in this book, but believe that, with greater attention to them on Washington's part, they can, one by one, be resolved to the mutual benefit of both countries. Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Revival. Edited by Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982. Reviewed by Scott Campbell. The Western industrialized nations have still not recovered from the oil shocks of the 1970s. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), sensing and then acting on opportunities created by a demand market and the eclipse of the United States as the world's oil producer, pushed the price of oil up by 1000 percent. In a span of less than ten years, the producing nations turned the tables on the consuming nations, seizing control of world petroleum production levels, changing the terms and conditions of international oil transactions, and precipitating the greatest transfer of wealth in world history. What followed for the West was persistent, BOOK REVIEWS 237 debilitating stagflation, lost growth, and deep recession. Today the legacy of the oil shocks is still not fully appreciated, nor is the likelihood of future shocks fully recognized . A public policy response that has lurched from the "moral equivalent of war" to the "invisible hand" is indicative of the confusion and lack of consensus on the energy issue in the United States. The highly cyclical nature of oil prices fosters a recurring boom-or-bust atmosphere in the capital markets and a sense of either crisis or well-being in the media. Short-term price action on the Rotterdam spot market and news of the latest exchange of insults at OPEC meetings become new salvos in a continuing debate about the future price and availability of oil. During the last several months, the so-called "glut" has given the edge to those who forecast major declines in the price of oil, prompting the cover story earlier this year in Harper's entitled "In Case You Missed It. . . . The Oil Crisis Is Over." Such views have gained considerable currency in the United States and contribute to what critics of energy complacency call the "glut psychology"—a belief that higher...