After Cancún, the Deluge?

AFTER CANCÚN, THE DELUGE? Jahangir Amuzegar JLhe post-Cancun1 period has proved anticlimactic for the North-South dialogue. After looking forward for months with great anticipation to the much-touted Mexico meeting of twenty-two of the world's most influential leaders in October 1981, the Third World is still unsure of the summit's concrete results. Those sympathetic to the plight of the less-developed countries (ldcs) have called Cancún a failure, and have dismissed it as "hollow theatrics." No one considers it to have been successful in breaking the decadeold deadlock in North-South relations. The origin of the dialogue between the rich North and the poor South probably dates back to the first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), which was held in Delhi in 1964, although the 1975 Paris Conference of International Economic Cooperation (ciec) may claim a clearer nomenclatural parentage. In Delhi, as in Paris, however, and in subsequent international gatherings (e.g., unctads II, III, IV, and V; the U.N. Special Sessions V and VI; the continuing U.N. Committee of the Whole; the 1981 1 . The international meeting on cooperation and development was held in Cancún, Mexico, October 22—23, 1981. Heads of state from eight developed countries and fourteen developing countries met to discuss the North-South relationship in the areas of food security, trade, commodities, energy, and monetary issues. Jahangir Amuzegar is a professorial lecturer at SAIS and has taught previously at a number of prominent American universities. From 1973 to 1980 Mr. Amuzegar served as the executive director ofthe International Monetary Fund (IMF). He has written extensively on Third World economic development and international trade matters. He is author of Comparative Economics: National Priorities, Policies, and Performance (Boston: Winthrop Publishers, 1981). 195 196 SAIS REVIEW U.N. Conference on the Least-Developed Countries; and the annual summits of the seven industrial nations), the essence of discussions has revolved around variations on one discordant theme—the establishment of a "new international economic order" (nieo). While the South has continually pressed for substantive changes in the present global economic system, the North not only has resisted any radical changes in the existing institutional arrangements , but has shunned the very notion of nieo. Stripped of its complex formulations, nieo calls for new mechanisms designed to increase the South's stake in global wealth and output and in world economic decision-making. Such shifts in the economic and political sharing of power, in turn, are meant to be implemented through changes in the system on international trade, finance, raw materials (including food and fuel), transfers of technology, aid, and debts. Where trade is concerned, the South's demands have focused on concessions within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences, on easier and more secure entry in developed markets by ldc manufactures, and on a definite target for ldcs' share of manufactures and technological research by the end of the century. With regard to money and finance, there has been a range of issues, including the revision of the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the ldcs' ready access to international capital markets, to the control over creation and distribution of international liquidity, a link between imf's Special Drawing Rights and development assistance, and the provision ofa "safety net" against any sudden poor-world liquidity crises. With regard to raw materials, the ldcs have asked for a real increase in their export earnings through improvements in the terms of trade, and for a stabilization of export proceeds through both compensatory facilities and the Integrated Program for Commodities. In the specific sector of energy, interests have centered on an orderly process of energy pricing, assurances of energy conservation, capital inflows for domestic energy development, and an "energy affiliate" of the World Bank that would expedite such flows. The ldcs have been equally concerned about increased grain production, adequate food reserves, and emergency relief. The ldcs have also requested genuine and reasonably priced transfers of technology for accelerating the industrialization of their countries—including the adaptation and application of transplanted know-how. The need for increased aid flows has been emphasized in particular...