PRC-Taiwan Relations: 1983-1993

PRC-TAIWAN RELATIONS: 1983-1993. Alhn S. Whiting .Lorecasting the evolution of relations between the People's Republic of China (prc) and the island of Taiwan for the period of 1983—93 is literally impossible in view of the variable factors whose separate and interrelated development can cause different outcomes. For Taiwan, these factors include the likely but not certain passage of Chiang Ching-kuo from leadership during this time; the alternative possibilities of a smooth succession versus a struggle between mainlander elements and native Taiwanese; perpetuation of the status quo versus an eventual willingness to negotiate with the prc; or finally, emergence of an independent Taiwan regime. For the prc, forecasting is made even more complicated by external as well as internal factors, whose course cannot be confidently anticipated. SinoAmerican relations are in part a function of how the United States relates to Taiwan, particularly in the sale of arms. But they are also affected by how Beijing perceives Washington's global power balance vis-à-vis Moscow. This in turn raises the question of Sino-Soviet relations with the options of continued confrontation or gradual détente. The latter pertains to Taiwan because it would entail the reduction of pla (People's Liberation Army) deployments along the extensive Sino-Soviet frontier, thus, possibly, freeing troops for use against Taiwan. Domestic politics in Beijing will also affect the prc posture on Taiwan, depending on consistent leadership and policy priorities. The Taiwanese Allan S. Whiting is professor of political science at the University of Arizona, and from 1968 to 1982 he taught at the University of Michigan. In the 1960s Professor Whiting served as director of the U.S. Department of State's Office of Research and Analysis (Far East), and as deputy consul general, Hong Kong. He is author of Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promue? (Stanford University Press, 1981). 131 132 SAIS REVIEW issue invites exploitation by a determined opposition because it combines the nationalistic goal of territorial unity, which is obstructed by foreign intervention , with the ideological goal of opposition to "hegemonism," in this case "U.S. imperialism." Debate over policy priorities may arise if economic modernization fails to meet proclaimed targets, or if its costs in financial and ideological terms appear excessive. Should these conditions prevail, the tempering of the Taiwan issue for the sake of assuring continued American and Japanese cooperation in China's economic development may be challenged as unwise as well as unnecessary. For the 18.2 million people on Taiwan, of whom only 15 percent are mainlander Chinese or their descendants, vital questions concerning political attitudes and preferences with respect to the present system or to alternative futures can only be answered through impressionistic interviews, anecdotal accounts, and scattered data of uncertain reliability or relevance.1 There are no public opinion polls on such matters, and no freedom of press, speech, or assembly with which to address the main issues. Obviously these constraints apply even more forcefully in the prc, where any effort to ascertain perceptions , whether elite or mass, must be largely inferential, if not wholly speculative . Within these severe limitations, however, the key variables can be identified and analyzed for their probable interaction and impact on PRC-Taiwan relations. Our main emphasis here will be initially on the internal situation, especially political, as it may evolve during the period under examination. This will be followed by an analysis of prc policies and their prospective evolution. This approach is justified by prc statements concerning the conditions that would necessitate the use of force against Taiwan. As stated privately by Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping and others, these include (1) Taiwan's acquisition ofnuclear weapons, (2) Taiwan's affiliation with the Soviet Union, and (3) Taiwan's refusal to negotiate.2 The likelihood of the first two contingencies is virtually nil. Taiwan could not develop and deploy a viable nuclear-weapons system without knowledge thereof becoming available to both Washington and Beijing at an early date. Neither is the possibility ofa Soviet-Taiwan connection a realistic option. 1 . This is not to denigrate in any way the insightful and illuminating analyses of politics and society on Taiwan, which are contained in various...