Arms Control: No Hiding Place

ARMS CONTROL: NO HIDING PLACE Lawrence Freedman Ar L.rms controllers are exhibiting their first signs of optimism for the first time in more than two years. In the lean years of 1980 and 1981, the fashion, to use Winston Churchill's terminology, moved away from "jaw-jaw" and seemed to become perilously close to "war-war." There was minimal EastWest contact, no active negotiations, the loss of salt ii, and the arrival of an American president who viewed arms control as, at best, no substitute for rearmament and, at worst, an excuse for consorting with the devil. Now perhaps the tide has turned. Apart from a flurry ofactivity in the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual Force Reductions, there has been a return to talks on nuclear arms in Geneva. The old salt process has now been divided into two: talks on intermediate nuclear forces began in November 1981 and on strategic arms in June 1982. President Reagan would argue that his position has been quite consistent. His objection has never been to arms control per se but only to treaties that favored the Soviet Union more than the United States and failed to provide "deep cuts." His own philosophy is reflected fully in the proposals tabled by his administration at the various talks. Initially, the Reagan philosophy appeared to require that the Soviet Union modify its international behavior Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies, and chairman of the department , at King's College London at the University of London. He has held research positions at Nuffield College, Oxford, and at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) before becoming head of policy studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In addition to numerous articles on defense and foreign policy, Professor Freedman is the author of U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (1977), Britain andNuclear Weapons (1980), and TheEvolution ofNuclear Strategy (1981). 4 SAIS REVIEW before the United States contemplatedjoint endeavors to end the arms race. With Soviet troops still in Afghanistan and martial law unrelaxed in Poland, the "linkage" criteria have not been met, but negotiations are still under way. The arms controllers hope that the tide has now turned, basing this hope on the domestic factors that have already made the difference: the need to head off the disarmament movement in Europe and the "freeze" movement in the United States. The political climate now favors negotiation. However, to quote the old adage, you can take a horse to water but you can't make him drink. European leaders and old-fashioned arms controllers are congratulating themselves for their success in encouraging the Reagan administration to even talk to the U.S.S.R. They have paid far less attention to what is actually going to be said at the meetings or whether anything fruitful might be expected to emerge from the discussions. The U.S. proposals have been enthusiastically endorsed without any reference to either their strategic logic or their ability to serve as the basis of an agreement. Now, at last, it is possible to detect signs of concern that U.S. negotiating practice is insufficiently flexible. The prospect is starting to emerge of the new negotiating round becoming a source of tension both within nato and in East-West relations. Instead of a triumphal return, arms control may have a dismal failure that will discredit it for many years. It is easy enough to blame the ideological stubborness and opportunism of the leaders of both superpowers for this state of affairs, and to chastise them for a lack of vision and a reckless disregard of the dangers of the arms race. Yet West Europeans must also accept responsibility. Their leaders have encouraged the view that multilateral arms control can succeed where unilateral disarmament will fail, and by itself, improve the overall state of EastWest relations. Their anxiety for visible signs of progress has resulted in uncritical enthusiasm for any evidence of discussions without due regard for their content. My concern is that arms control has been elevated by its friends into something that it is not and can never be. More is now expected than can be delivered, and this could have...