A German Perspective on East-West Relations

A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE ON EASTWEST RELATIONS Karsten Voight Xhe essential question facing the Western alliance is how and when nato should react to martial law in Poland in order to pursue the common goals ofthe Western alliance with the greatest possible success. Again, the question is not whether the alliance should react, but how. One answer lies in an analysis of the European political power constellation , as a product of World War II and Yalta. As a result of power shifts after World War II, the Soviet Union was able to spread its influence across Eastern and parts of Central Europe without encountering any great resistance and, at times, with the approval of the Western allies. However, various forces in Eastern and Central Europe have demonstrated their resistance to this situation. The workers' revolt in East Berlin, the Hungarian rebellion, the Prague Spring, and the recurring protest and reform movements in Poland are clear signs of this resistance. In Eastern Europe and the West, there are many ongoing discussions about this situation, whether it can be changed, and if so, how. Two possible solutions can be eliminated from the start. The first solution is that only force can change the situation. Even during the most critical stages of the cold war, this approach was never seriously considered in the West, although the United States had an atomicweapons monopoly at that time. The second alternative—a return to the cold war—must also be rejected. This was the politics of crisis speculation—pressure escalating to the brink of war, which the Americans referred to as "brinkmanship." The attempt to Karsten Voight is the parliamentary foreign affairs spokesman for the present Social Democratic government in the Federal Republic of Germany. This article was translated by Pamela M. Kesting, an M.A. candidate at SAIS. 73 74 SAIS REVIEW implement change through military pressure ended in a fiasco. During this "roll-back" period the Soviets became an atomic power, then a world power, and finally an equal world power. The cold war had only two consequences for Germany and Europe: it deepened the chasm between Germany and Europe and allowed the German Democratic Republic (gdr) to become a state. A return to a cold war philosophy would be a masochistic political move. The West must abandon its posture of "verbal radicalism." It should not voice support for reform movements in the Eastern bloc as though it were willing to intervene forcefully in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary is a classic example ofpolitical rhetoric that creates the illusion that reform movements in the Eastern bloc will receive preventive help from the West. As long as we realize that this kind of help would lead to a new world war, it cannot even be considered in theory, let alone in practice. The people of Eastern Europe would foot the bill in the long run. The West's policy must be to initiate change through rapprochement. It is not as though we are bereft of any means of influencing the developments in the Eastern bloc. The rejection of force—which is the core of rapprochement—has allowed the West during the past ten years to pursue détente in Eastern Europe. As a result, gradual progress was made in the field of human rights. Détente facilitated numerous human contacts and began to penetrate the so-called Iron Curtain. Sports, cultural, economic, and political contacts among the peoples of Europe have begun to reunite them, helping to relax the cold war atmosphere. Thus, détente has picked up on the old European tradition of human rights, which was confirmed in Helsinki, even by the Soviets. The basis for détente is the December 13, 1967, Harmel Report from nato, which clarifies the two primary functions of the Atlantic Alliance. "The first objective is to maintain a sufficient military strength and political solidarity in order to weaken aggressions and other forms of pressure, and to protect the member-states in the event of possible aggression. Under these conditions, the members of the alliance will maintain the potential necessary for balanced military forces and thus create a climate of stability, security and trust." This is necessary in order...