What is Wrong With U.S.-West German Relations?

WHAT IS WRONG WITH U.S.-_ WEST GERMAN RELATIONS? Hans-Peter Schwarz A hroughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the public reactions in England, France, and the United States toward Germany and the Germans have often been marked by curiosity and astonishment. On occasion, observers have been stunned by Germany's adventurous and expansionist foreign policy. Other times, they have been left shaking their heads over the irritating indecisiveness of German cabinets. In 1860, for example, The Times—commenting on the liberal foreign policy of the Prussian government, which was proud of its "moral conquests" all over Europe—wrote the following: Prussia is always leaning on somebody, always getting somebody to help her, never willing to help herself; always ready to deliberate, never to decide; present in Congresses, but absent in battles; speaking and writing, never for or against, but only on, the question; ready to supply any amount of ideals and sentiments, but shy of anything that savors of the real or actual. She has a large army, but notoriously one in no condition for fighting. She is profuse in circulars and notes, but has generally a little to say for both sides. No one counts on her as a friend; no one dreads her as an enemy. How she became a great Power history tells us; why she remains so nobody can tell.1 1. Cited in Raymond James Sontag, Germany and England 1848—1894 (New York: Rüssel & Rüssel, 1938), p. 33. Professor Hans-Peter Schwarz is Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne, Director of the university's Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen, and EditorofVierteljahrsheftefürZeitgeschichte. His most recent book is entitled Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in derJahren der Besatzungsherrschaft, 1945-1949 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1980). 53 54 SAIS REVIEW Echos of this scornful appraisal, which was published during the "New Era," can be found in contemporary editorials on Bonn's foreign policy by Raymond Aron in the Paris L'Express and by William Safire in The New York Times. The symptoms of West German ambivalence are well-known and manifest on all government levels. On the diplomatic level, Bonn has made a tangible effort to moderate critical Western stances against Soviet aggression ; as, for example, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the suppression of the Polish reform movement by Communist party and military leaderships. Sometimes Chancellor Schmidt appears to be assuming the role of an "honest broker" or an "interpreter" between America and the U.S.S.R., and sometimes he abandons this role. Nevertheless, the impression remains that Germany "has generally a little to say for both sides." This appearance of irresolution is strengthened by Bonn's unwillingness to drastically increase military expenditures, which, according to the American and French governments, is necessitated by the world situation. On the domestic level, the left wing of the Social Democratic party (spd) and (albeit somewhat in parlando) a strong minority of the Free Democratic party (fdp) are critical of the nato missile-modernization program. They tend to characterize the Reagan administration as trigger-happy and to take issue with American readiness for confrontation, while explaining away the Soviet military buildup in terms of its understandable fear ofbeing encircled and isolated. Similarly, the Social Democratic youth organization, diejungsozialisten , which, according to party statutes, comprises almost a third of the spd (that is, all members under thirty-five), has been agitating incessantly— together with neutralist-pacifist church groups and the Moscow-controlled German Communist party (dkp)—against the production of neutron warheads . The so-called peace movement, on the other hand, looks the other way when the Polish militia closes universities and destroys one ofthe largest free labor movements in European history. German banks and steel firms appear to be predominantly interested in Eastern trade. The same seems to hold true, however, for labor unions. Indeed, since the end of the 1960s, the German Federation of Labor (dgb) has developed a strong interest in Ostpolitik and has established a number of official contacts with labor representatives of Eastern bloc countries. The dgb has responded to the recent events in...