A Policy for Dealing with Libya

A POLICY FOR DEALING WITH LIBYA G. Henry M. Schüler Xreliminary evidence linking the assassins of President Anwar Sadat to a Moslem extremist group called "AlJihad" has rekindled debate about the best way to frustrate Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's ambitions. Although Cairo and Washington chose not to make public Al Jihad's Libyan connection in the aftermath of the assassination, journalists in both capitals have been reporting for several years that Libya was supplying funds, arms, and training for that organization in its "holy war" against the late Egyptian president. The debate about meeting the Qaddafi threat has been thrust repeatedly upon policymakers by over a decade of Libyan attacks on America's security interests , strategic relationships, and diplomatic initiatives all around the world, but the issue has never been debated to conclusion, and, as a result, American policy has been marked by indecision and inaction. The principal barrier to conclusive deliberations lies in the refusal of many area experts to attribute much historical relevance or regional significance to Libya or its aggressive leader. Those who subscribe to this conventional wisdom do not take seriously his repeatedly proclaimed strategic goals. At first glance, Qaddafi's goals certainly do appear excessively ambitious at home and abroad. Qaddafi's domestic policy seeks to transform Libyan society by mixing conservative religious fundamentalism with the radical political and economic innovation of his Green Book. His goals in foreign affairs are even more startling, including establishing an Islamic state across the Sahara, championing anticolonialism as the leader of the Organization of This analysis reflects G. Henry M. Schuler's many years in Libya as a foreign service officer, oil company executive, and member of the oil industry's negotiating team. A graduate of Princeton (history) and the University of Pennsylvania Law School (international law), Mr. Schüler is director for energy planning and development in the Washington, D.C, national affairs office of Deloitte Haskins and Sells. 199 200 SAIS REVIEW African Unity, leading a worldwide pan-Islamic and pan-Arab revival, and reducing American influence throughout the region. Faced with that challenging agenda, many analysts doubt both the degree of Qaddafi's commitment and also the amount of popular Libyan support for his goals. These experts inevitably conclude that it is only a question of time before he "mellows" or is rejected without outside pressure, so they counsel that he be ignored and even accommodated instead of being singled out and confronted. As a result, policy discussions are sidetracked before they reach the fundamental question of how to frustrate Qaddafi's ambitions. The inconclusive results of the debate and the lack of a definitive policy choice have led to a decade of American vacillation, with the "accommodators" reviving their quest for a modus vivendi each time a lull occurs after some especially egregious Libyan violation of the norms of international behavior has pushed the "confronters" temporarily to the fore. This vacillation has disheartened our friends in the region, discredited our efforts to secure European support, emboldened the Soviet Union, and prompted Qaddafi to continue probing the limits of our irresolution. We cannot afford further indecision and inaction, for Qaddafi has proclaimed his intention to fuel the flames of open insurgency and of discontent throughout Africa and the Middle East. Some would belittle the significance of a changed orientation in several of the countries there, but no one would deny that many of them lie perilously close to the energy heartland, where efforts to create radical and hostile regimes would almost certainly lead to a superpower confrontation. Therefore, to avoid drifting into a perilous conflict, we must move toward a coherent Libya policy by reexamining the preliminary question of Qaddafi's significance and relevance as well as the fundamental question of how best to deal with the menace that he poses. It may well be that much of the tendency to underestimate Qaddafi and Libya can be attributed to the fact that neither fits into the neat niches in which journalists, scholars, and bureaucrats practice their professions. Although Libya is part of the African continent, it is assigned to a smaller group of specialists who study the culturally and racially distinct group of countries...