Counsels of War (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 287 Komer's cure for these ills is not novel. He proposes that the United States rely more heavily on its allies through greater burden-sharing and the more efficient allocation of resources. He perceives the United States to be dependent upon its coalition strategy. He follows the traditional tenets of MacKinder's "heartland" model rather than the precepts of Mahan's faith in maritime power. Komer sees in the Reagan administration's plans to develop a 600-ship navy the seeds of a dramatic shift to a naval strategy for U.S. security. Komer accomplishes his tasks of assaulting the potential results of such a move and of proving the virtues of a coalition strategy. Record makes opposite recommendations: the replacement of at least three U.S. divisions in Europe by allied units, U.S. concentration on defense of the Persian Gulf, a closer military involvement with China, efforts to weaken the loyalty of the Soviet Union's East European allies, a more aggressive military doctrine, increased reliance on reserve forces, and improved strategic mobility. Record presents his points skillfully and makes provocative arguments. However , he devotes scant attention to the political repercussions of his proposed changes. While Komer seems to deal with this issue more extensively and convincingly , one wonders whether he should really be so concerned. A maritime strategy may be the ultimate goal of a few naval enthusiasts in the administration but there is no overall effort to make such a change within the Reagan administration. Komer fears that budgetary pressures will force a choice among priorities and that locked in shipbuilding contracts will survive because of the waste involved in cancelling them. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any U.S. administration would alter its basic disposition toward the world on that basis. Moreover, such a choice will likely face the next administration, not this one, and Komer could very well be a part of that administration. Counsels ofWar. By Gregg Herken. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. pp. 409. Reviewed by David G. Wiencek, former editor ofThe Congressional Record Scanner, affiliated with the Arms Control Association. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative raises some critical issues for nuclear arms policy: Will it render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete"? Or will it set off a new round in the race for strategic superiority? Proponents and opponents of the plan are hotly debating these questions. But Star Wars is not unique. Since Hiroshima, new weapons technologies have often produced similar controversies. These technologies also pose fundamental questions concerning the role of science in service to the state. Such issues are among those recorded and explored in Yale historian Gregg Herken's Counsels of War. The study examines the role and views of the experts and advisors—scientists, academics, and think-tank strategists—who helped shape and determine U.S. nuclear strategy in the postwar era. The author's conclusion reflects the disillusionment with which he views the forty-year history of advising on nuclear issues. The experts are often divided among themselves, and as a result there has been a remarkable lack of progress toward resolving the problem of quantitative and qualitative additions to strategic arsenals. Herken traces the division to the earliest atomic scientists who viewed the bomb as "either the symbol of creation or a presentiment of 288 SAIS REVIEW doomsday." Thereafter, a policy debate ensued reinforcing the basic intellectual cleavage. Primarily at issue were differing interpretations and emphases given to deterrence and the necessary forces and strategy to implement it. On the whole, CounseL· ofWar is balanced and fair. It is written for a general audience and, as such, serves as a useful supplement to the more detailed strategic analyses of Lawrence Freedman, Michael Mandelbaum, Colin Gray, and David Rosenberg. Herken's account is based in part on interviews with more than sixty prominent figures, including key policymakers. In this regard, the book parallels Fred Kaplan's The Wizards ofArmageddon, published just two years ago. (Kaplan, incidentally, draws a similar conclusion on the effectiveness of the strategists.) Also of special interest here is the unpublished material Herken adduces to bolster his study, particularly Bernard Brodie's manuscripts and letters. One interesting footnote...