Japan's Growing Involvement in the Middle East

JAPAN'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST Marvin Ott he last two years have witnessed the first systematic effort since World War II to defineJapanese foreign policy interests in global terms, including an attempt to extend the reach of Japanese foreign policy beyond its established emphasis on relations with the United States and the nearby countries of Asia to other areas—especially the Middle East. Throughout most of the postwar period, Japanese foreign policy was notable for its absence of political initiative and its almost total preoccupation with commerce. With single-minded determination, Japan focused on postwar economic reconstruction and the development of overseas markets for its manufactured products; on political and security issues, Tokyo was with few exceptions content to follow the U.S. lead. To borrow a phrase, "the business ofJapan was business." By the end of the 1970s Japan's prosperity, accompanied by American economic difficulties , led to growing pressures from Washington for Tokyo to assume a greater international burden. The sheer size and dynamism of the Japanese economy precluded Tokyo's sitting on the sidelines of international affairs. The 1982 election of Yasuhiro Nakasone led Japan toward center stage as Nakasone attended summit meetings with other leaders of the industrialized democracies and implemented a burst of diplomatic initiatives toward the Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Pakistanis, and Southeast Asians. Marvin Ott is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 221 222 SAIS REVIEW When Nakasone was first elected by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (ldp) to be prime minister in 1982, few thought he would survive for long. Having failed in his two previous attempts at the office, he was the last of his generation to become prime minister. He headed a small faction in the Diet and owed his selection to the support of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, the powerful "shadow shogun" who had been driven from office by the Lockheed bribery scandal. Nevertheless, Tanaka continued to dominate the Liberal Democratic Party—and consequently Japanese—politics, and Nakasone was regarded as little more than his political puppet. Moreover, Nakasone came to office as a controversial figure, known for views on defense and foreign policy that were hawkish in comparison to prevailing national opinion. Consequently , the public seemed to greet his election with more uneasiness than enthusiasm. Nakasone's first and overriding task was to strengthen his political base. He chose to break the pattern of focusing on domestic economic growth established by his predecessors, and concentrated instead on foreign policy. Here he had greater freedom of action than on the domestic front, where powerful interests impinged on every policy initiative. By displaying strong leadership in foreign affairs, he hoped to bolster his own position and instill in his countrymen a more self-assured sense of their place in the world. Nakasone's activist bent and his interest in the Middle East has been shared by his Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe. Abe, one of a small group of fast-rising "New Leaders" in the Liberal Democratic Party, has clear ambitions to become prime minister himself. Consequently, he has sought the public spotlight and chafed under Nakasone's tendency to act as his own foreign minister. In the search for an arena in which he could make his own imprint—on policy and in the newspapers—Abe has siezed on the Middle East. Consequently, Japanese policy toward the Middle East under the Nakasone administration is shaped by a combination of vital national interests, perceived opportunities, and personal political ambitions. The United States has a clear interest in the relationship between its principal Asian ally and a region that supplies 60 percent of the oil consumed by the industrial democracies (oecd) and nearly 70 percent of that consumed by Japan. Beyond its obvious general stake in the health of the Japanese economy, the United States is obligated by international agreement1 to help make up any shortfall in Japanese oil imports due to a curtailment of supplies from the Middle East. Moreover, the United 1. "Agreement on International Energy Program" (as amended 19 May 1980), International Energy Agency. JAPAN'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 223 States has long urged Japan to become more active...