The 1982 Palestinian-Israeli War: Victory for None, Defeat for Many

THE 1982 PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WAR: VICTORY FOR NONE, DEFEAT FOR MANY Farid El-Khazen ..midst the mounting anarchy in the Middle East, peace remains an issue of political debate. Increasingly, that debate is couched in vague and elusive terms. The illusion of a peace process is preserved on the surface, thanks to some highly publicized diplomatic moves—trips to the Middle East by U.S. officials, visits to Washington by "moderate" Arab and Israeli leaders, and talk about some undefinedJordanian-sponsored Palestinian-Israeli agreement. Regardless of how productive these moves might be, they are beset by a major handicap: the 1982 debacle in Lebanon, still fresh in the memory of all parties involved. Not only must the legacy of that disaster be overcome, it must also be redeemed by accomplishments that will assuage its traumatic effects. The sense ofbewilderment and disillusionment among both the Middle East people and their leaders is enormous. A general dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs is shared by almost every Middle East country. On the peace front, Egypt and Israel are at their lowest level of "peaceful" relations since the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. Arab regimes, for their part, are embroiled in bitter feuds for domestic control and, in some instances, regional hegemony. And as Iran and Iraq are locked in a bloody war over religion, history, and geography, the Gulfcountries live in a permanent state of insecurity, heightened by recent assassination attempts in Kuwait. Even some North African states are entering a period of increasing regional conflict and domestic instability. Farid El-Khazen is a doctoral candidate at SAIS. He writes frequently on Middle East issues. His latest article, on the Lebanese economy, appeared in AmericanArab Affairs. 75 76 SAIS REVIEW In the Fertile Crescent, which has traditionally been unstable, Syria is paving the way for another so-called peace mission in Lebanon, this time at the "invitation" ofall the country's official warlords. Israel, by contrast, is unable to decide with whom to make peace or against whom to wage war; its society is torn between the pragmatism of yesterday and the extremism of tomorrow. As for the plo, it is desperately trying to make peace with itself and with its Arab "brothers" before seeking peace (or war) with the real enemy. The climate of chronic uncertainty and confusion that engulfs the region makes the Middle East an unlikely subject for quick-fix solutions or hasty peace initiatives, for no one is willing to sacrifice stability for empty rhetoric and unnecessary military adventurism. For Arab regimes the stability of the existing order is too precious to be endangered by futile undertakings. For Israel the 1982 Lebanon war illustrated the perils ofsuch adventurism. Both the Arab regimes and Israel could stand to lose from an abrupt change in the existing stalemate. This is because no government can be sure that it would be able to manage the consequences of any drastic change in the post-1982 Arab-Israeli balance of power. Of all the protagonists, the Palestinians are the most impatient for drastic measures. But contrary to their wishes, patience and pragmatism are the new-found virtues in the region. In the wake of the 1982 war the discrepancy between the plo's irredentism and the protagonist states' sober realpolitik is all the more apparent. Deprived of the freedom and relative safety of Beirut, the plo today finds its field of independent action dramatically constrained. After several decades of revolutionary change, ideological conflicts, wars, and partial peace, Arab-Israeli differences have hardly ameliorated ; the situation remains as divisive and explosive as ever. What is unprecedented today, however, is the growing sense of helplessness that characterizes the political process in the region. Both Arab and Israeli governments are increasingly on the defensive and thus are unable to break the existing deadlock. The early symptoms of this continuing malaise can be traced back to the inconclusive outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which did not produce military defeat or political victory for either side. This unfinished war gave birth to two major developments that left the Arab-Israeli conflict in an ill-defined standoffsomewhere between war and peace: the Camp...