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U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE: _ THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS CONTRACTION Laurence Radway M.? thesis is that the United States should begin cautiously to withdraw its armed forces from Europe. Caution requires that withdrawal start without naive preconceptions about Soviet power or policy, that it be gradual, that it be monitored closely for evidence of destabilizing repercussions in Western and Eastern Europe, that it be accompanied by diplomatic reassurances designed to avert such repercussions, and that it be motivated neither by impatience with our allies nor by readiness to see them absorbed into the Soviet orbit. At the outset it must be conceded that there is no groundswell for American disengagement on either side of the Atlantic. Most European leaders believe that the presence of U.S. troops has helped keep the peace by deterring Soviet aggression and rendering unlikely the rebirth of German bellicosity. They are prepared to support various fine-tunings of the alliance; for instance, annual increases in inflation-adjusted defense budgets, stronger conventional forces to obviate early use of nuclear weapons, and the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons. But such positions are consistent with U.S. policy and imply no dramatic cuts in U.S. force levels. To be sure, many Europeans complain about the United States' influence over matters vital to their very survival. They crave a greater measure of independence. Some believe that self-respect requires them to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Others observe that Laurence Radway is professor of political science at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 227 228 SAIS REVIEW American help may not be around forever. Many are irritated by America's relentless pressure for greater defense spending. Attentive publics are not only highly sensitive to competing domestic demands but are often less convinced of a Soviet menace and more skeptical about thè utility of marginal increases in military strength. Moreover, American security policies frequently strike them as rash or erratic. Dismay over Washington's abrupt changes on the neutron bomb and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (salt) are paralleled by European charges that the United States overreacts to crises in Afghanistan, Poland, Lebanon, Grenada, and Central America. The natural response is to seek greater autonomy, as de Gaulle did by withdrawing French forces from jvato commands. I concede that such misgivings about America are less pronounced among citizens at large than among "highly educated, politically attuned, well-organized, and emotionally engaged individuals ."1 But this is primarily because the latter follow public affairs more closely. Eventually, the general public usually catches up with opinion leaders who advocate greater assertiveness and self-concern in foreign affairs. On the other hand, there are limits to Western Europeans' quest for autonomy. One is set by a general bias against nuclear proliferation. Within jvato nuclear autonomy appears possible only for France, the United States, and Britain. After the Suez crisis, France apparently did express interest in cooperating with West Germany to produce nuclear weapons on French soil. But the scenario of a Federal Republic equipped with its own sea- and land-based nuclear forces horrifies each member of both jvato and the Warsaw Pact; even Samuel P. Huntington, who argues that it deserves "far fuller and more serious consideration than it has received," adds that he does not now recommend the policy.2 A more important limit is set by the unreadiness of America's allies to jettison the alliance. It is conceivable, for example, that Ottawa could yield to domestic pressures to bring Canadian troops home from Europe; it is harder to imagine that it would terminate membership in the treaty organization. Most autonomists want autonomy within the alliance. They propose to gain it by cooperating with each other, especially in conventional defense. By pooling efforts, by contributing more, they hope to win greater influence in Third World affairs as well as over matters closer to home. Convinced they possess a more subtle and sensitive understanding of historical forces, allied statesmen long to play Athens to the American Rome. This drives them to seek some form of West European military 1.Gregory Flynn, "Public Opinion and Atlantic Defense," JVATO Review 31 (Fall 1983). 2."Broadening the Strategic Focus...

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