America's Defense Challenge

AMERICA'S DEFENSE CHALLENGE John Glenn KJINCE a government's first responsibility is to ensure the safety and survivability of the nation and its people, a strong national defense structure is of utmost importance. To the United States in the mid-1980s this means implementing a fiscally responsible modernization program for our armed services. However, carrying out an acceptable American defense program demands not only substantial monetary commitments, it also requires that defense-program architects exercise both a high degree of moral courage and a political farsightedness frequently difficult to achieve. There are five key elements needed to establish and maintain a strong U.S. national defense: 1.Accurate assessment of the threat; 2.Designation of arms control as a key factor in U.S. national security policy; 3.Identification of and willingness to defend truly vital national interests; 4.Implementation of an effective approach to Third World problems ; and 5.Maintenance of a credible military posture. This discussion of America's defense will address the first four elements briefly and concentrate on the fifth. John Glenn has been a senator from Ohio since 1974 and is presently serving on the Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs committees. 25 26 SAIS REVIEW A nation's foreign policy establishes the goals and objectives for defense policy; consequently, U.S. defense needs are based largely on our assessment of the nature of our principal adversary and its goals. Without a doubt, the Soviet Union remains fundamentally hostile to U.S. and Western interests and continues to follow a foreign policy that is inherently threatening. There is little argument that the Soviets' unprecedented military buildup over the past twenty years, as well as their expansionist tendencies and their continuing control over other bloc nations, requires that the U.S. modernize its forces. To do less would lay us open to the political blackmail the Soviets often impose on nations that cannot adequately defend themselves . The question, then, is not whether modernization is necessary, but how best to accomplish it at an affordable cost given both our huge budget deficit and our contending domestic priorities. Inextricably tied to an accurate assessment of the threat is the equally contentious issue ofarms control. In an age when the next war could well be the last, negotiating mutual and verifiable agreements on nuclear weapons is the preeminent defense issue of our age. A sound arms control program will set reasonable and realistic priorities and make constant and consistent efforts. The first element of an arms control program should be a mutual and verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons. Although by no means a panacea, a freeze would buy time to negotiate significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles. Without a freeze, either side could deploy major new weaponssystems that could well render meaningless the very reductions sought in the negotiations. But a freeze need not preclude all or any force modernizations. In fact, modernizing weapons-systems in ways that make them less threatening is entirely compatible with the cause ofarms control. However, modernization efforts that constitute destabilizing measures which upset the existing balance or otherwise limit our flexibility in negotiations must be avoided. The second step in arms control strategy should be to seek the reduction of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In strategic terms, both the United States and the Soviet Union can substantially reduce nuclear forces while actually enhancing national security. Any such reductions must meet four vital criteria: They must increase stability, they must enhance deterrence, they must be mutual, and they must be adequately verifiable. Logically, the third objective is to halt the spread ofnuclear weapons to ever more nations around the world.1 But despite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (a U.S. initiative), more countries are gaining 1. This has been one of my top priorities from the day I entered the Senate in 1975. In that regard I am proud to have coauthored the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. AMERICA'S DEFENSE CHALLENGE 27 a nuclear potential with each passing year. The fourth element is simple, but often overlooked. Other nations possessing nuclear weapons must be brought into the arms control process. No long-term freeze or reductions agreement would be...