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THE PLO AND THE PEACE PROCESS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVE Aaron David Miller JLn A MARCH 1984 INTERVIEW PLU Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat was asked whether preserving the Palestine Liberation Organization as an organization was more important than regaining Arab territory. His answer was stunningly simple: the liberation of the land is the same as the liberation organization.1 Arafat's response reflected much more than the revolutionary sloganeering of the Palestinian national movement. It highlighted a central reality in analyzing the PLO and its politics, particularly with respect to negotiated solutions of the Arab-Israeli conflict: organizational needs and requirements— from preserving Arafat's own leadership position to maintaining the unity of his core Fatah group — remain the key determinants of PLO decisionmaking. Other factors, to be sure, shape and influence PLO behavior. But in the end, protecting the role of the organization and the bureaucratic interests of the men who dominate it set PLO policy on core issues. Indeed, organizational survival dictates organizational behavior. The organizational imperative does not exist simply as an end in itself. It is important to understand that the attachment to the organization and the need to preserve its integrity go well beyond the political or financial perquisites afforded PLO officials. These are important, to be sure, but the PLO does not exist in a vacuum or for the sole benefit 1. al-Biyadir al-Siyasi, 17 March 1984. Aaron David Miller is a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff. His most recent book is The Arab States and the Palestinian (Question: Between Ideology and Self-interest. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or any other U.S. government agency. 95 96 SAIS REVIEW of its leaders. The organization has come to represent a powerful force as both an idea and a reality in the development of the Palestinian national movement. And the PLO exerts a strong psychological pull as a symbol of Palestinian national identity both for its constituents and the men who control its institutions. Indeed the PLO has come to represent a kind of surrogate state and identity for an alienated and landless Palestinian constituency. Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon created new circumstances that would only reinforce this organizational imperative. Paradoxically, the war, though a military defeat, created new diplomatic opportunities for the Palestinian movement. The PLO survived the Israeli siege of Beirut and won widespread sympathy and increased recognition abroad. The Lebanon invasion, however, created two realities that severely constrained the PLOs room to maneuver in the region. First, the war ultimately limited the PLOs freedom of operations in Lebanon. Although pre- 1982 Lebanon could hardly be described as a safe haven for Palestinians , it gave the movement a base to organize politically and to launch operations against Israel. The PLOs control of West Beirut provided it with an opportunity to create a complex political and military infrastructure that coordinated diplomatic efforts abroad and reinforced ties with Palestinians throughout the diaspora. As the largest and wealthiest of the PLO groups, the Fatah faction led by Arafat was able to exercise considerable control and leverage with other constituent groups through its preeminence in the PLOs military, political, and financial institutions. Moreover, control over portions of southern Lebanon allowed the PLO to retain an armed presence — a sine qua non for an organization that requires armed struggle to maintain its cohesion and internal legitimacy. Second, the Israeli invasion and the widespread feeling within the PLO that Syria had done little to oppose it heightened long-standing tensions between Arafat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. Assad was determined to prevent the PLO from dragging Syria into any unplanned confrontations with Israel. For their part, Arafat's Fatah and other PLO groups were wary of becoming overly dependent on Syria. Here, too, the invasion circumscribed Arafat's room to maneuver and initially increased his dependence on Damascus. The Syrians were only too eager to curtail Arafat's military initiatives and to ensure that the PLO participated in no political initiatives with regard to the Arab-Israeli arena that they could not...

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