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BOOK REVIEWS The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945. By Alfred Grosser. Translated by Michael Shaw. New York: Continuum Publishing Corp., 1980, 332 pp. One often thinks of the Atlantic alliance as a relationship binding the United States and Europe—a "Europe" homogeneous and harmonious enough to be viewed as a whole. Vague references to "the Europeans " and "our European allies" obscure the very different ways in which the United States is viewed. Such a view hides one of the most fascinating and intricate facets of the Atlantic alliance: the relationships among the Europeans themselves. Although the community ofstates that emerged in the aftermath of World War II differs from that which existed previously, the "weight of the past" has left a lasting imprint on each nation. For this reason a discussion of the Atlantic alliance cannot begin in 1947, 1945, or even at some point during the war. It must reach back to the historical/political traditions of the European peoples, to the development of capitalism and democracy in America, and also to the interaction ofthis development with the political and cultural attitudes of the Europeans. These are points that Alfred Grosser emphasizes in The Western Alliance. Billed by Stanley Hoffmann as France's leading analyst of postwar Germany, Grosser is known for his studies of the relations among the major powers in Europe, particularly those between France and Germany. This impressive work traces in detail the history ofintraEuropean and American-European (as represented by individual states) relations since 1945. Grosser's most valuable contribution is his examination ofthe Atlantic alliance from a European point ofview. His focus is on the events, people, and policies of the major European actors—France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain—and to a lesser extent, Italy. The Benelux and Scandinavian countries are examined less frequently, as are Spain, Greece, and Turkey. As Grosser discusses the major European actors vis-à-vis the United States, he displays a remarkable objectivity within the context of his European perspective. It is difficult to tell where his sympathies lie, for he is at pains throughout to point out mistakes and misperceptions on all sides. Grosser uses two major tools to perform his analysis. The first is the role ofperception and misperception in the formulation offoreign policy. Here we most clearly see what Grosser means by his phrase "the weight of the past." Thèse perceptions are most dramatic in their effect upon 169 170 SAISREVIEW European views toward the United States. While France, Germany, and Great Britain exhibit their own nuances, each has displayed an ambivalent attitude toward its superpower ally. In Grosser's analysis, this ambivalence stems from the European antipathy toward capitalism; an antipathy that was spawned decades ago and that has lived on in the minds of the European publics. So, while America is culturally and politically their most compatible superpower, there remains an element of ideological distaste. The new alignment of power brought about by World War II only aggravated this ideological aversion as the proud European states were forced to admit their dependence on the capitalist, less-than-civilized, and naive United States. Grosser uses a parody of the Lord's Prayer that circulated in London after the Marshall Plan was announced as a humorous example of these slightly antagonistic feelings , while quickly pointing out that the Marshall aid was generally well received: Our Uncle which art in America Sam be thy name, Thy navy come, thy will be done, In London as 'tis in Washington. Give us this day our Marshall aid, And forgive us our un-American activities, As we forgive your American activities against us; And lead us not into Socialism But deliver us from Communism, For thine is our Kingdom, The Atom power and the Tory For ever and ever: G-men. In analyzing the course ofrelevant events, Grosser uses the impact ofpersonalities as his second major tool. One might argue that he is an adherent of the "Great Man" theory of history: to the influence of individuals is attributed the decisive elements of history. He awards a special place to Jean Monnet, the "inspirer" who, through the strength ofhis character and personal relationships with major...

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