Poland in Crisis

POLAND IN CRISIS Ronald D. Asmus S1 Ftalin is said to have once remarked to Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk that communism would fit Poland like a saddle fits a cow. True to that analogy, after three decades of"socialist construction," the forced fit ofSoviet-style communism on Polish society is causing severe strain, as demonstrated by the massive labor upheavals which have played havoc with the nation's political and economic system and sent shock waves through both East and West. Never before in the Soviet bloc has a stunned and weakened communist party been forced to recognize the workers' right to strike and independently organize themselves —a precedent that has raised both fears and hopes concerning the future. Yet, short of drastic changes in Europe's geopolitical realities, Poland will remain a socialist state. With Soviet troops reported to be increasingly active along the Polish border at this writing, a detailed analysis ofthe labor strikes and their consequences is clearly premature. Even so, it is useful to identify recent trends in Poland, and in U.S. relations with Eastern Europe as a whole, if only as a backdrop to an unfinished—and unsettling— drama. Often a forgotten area in American foreign policy, Eastern Europe once again occupies an important place on the world stage, and on the policy agenda of the United States. The wave of strikes in Poland was triggered in July 1980 by a government decision to increase the share ofmeat to be sold at premium prices in the commercial shops. At first glance, the quantity of meat involved—about 2 percent oftotal sales—appears relatively small. Yet Ronald D. Asmus is a candidate for the ??. degree at SAIS, and the holder ofthe first Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Fellowship in East German Affairs. During the summer of 1980, he served as a research analyst with Radio Free Europe in Munich. 107 108 SAIS REVIEW the event was politically important because meat consumption has been a status symbol in Poland, with many people willing to tolerate other deprivations in order to have meat. Lack of sensitivity to these sentiments played a major role in past labor unrest, both in 1970 and 1976. The Polish authorities, however, apparently did not heed their past lessons, for the July measures were introduced without prior notice or serious attempts at consultation with any social organizations. Resentment was particularly fierce due to a widespread feeling that increased meat cost would be only the first stage in a quiet attempt to raise prices on a variety of staples. The response of the Polish workers was immediate and broadbased . Strikes were first reported to have taken place at factories around Warsaw, Gdansk, and Lodz on July 2. By the middle of August, unrest had snowballed into an avalanche, with more than 300,000 workers laying down their tools. What had started as a protest over price hikes soon developed an ominous political tone as workers refused to be satisfied with proposed wage increases. They demanded institutional guarantees that their interests be safeguarded in the future by calling for "independent" trade unions free ofgovernment supervision. In an unprecedented development in a communist country, large numbers of workers in the Baltic area in and around Gdansk set up a joint committee—the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS)—and articulated a single list of concessions not only for themselves but for all Polish workers. By the end of August, with the Polish economy at a standstill and Western analysts on the edges oftheir seats, workers and authorities engaged in a high-pressured game ofnerves over the future political and economic evolution of Polish society. A turning point came on August 24 when then party chiefEdward Gierek, in an attempt to appease the striking workers, announced the sacking of six Politburo members, admitted that mistakes had been made, and promised new reforms for the future. In addition, a new set of party officials was sent to Gdansk to negotiate directly with the strikers' chosen representatives. The change in both the tone and the substance of the government's position indicated a greater willingness to come to terms with the workers and a realization that the party's original strategy...