America and Russia: An Uneasy Coexistence

AMERICA AND RUSSIA: ___ AN UNEASY COEXISTENCE Dim¡tri K. Simes .here is a striking contrast between the status of the East-West relationship ofthe early 1970s and that ofthe 1980s. Détente was born in 1970-1972 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and during a time when Moscow was publicly and proudly supporting the North Vietnamese, who were involved in a direct (ifundeclared) war with the United States. In the Middle East, the Kremlin was building bridges to Egypt and Syria by providing them with materiel, training, and even advisers against American-supported Israel. Furthermore, during the Israeli-Egyptian war of attrition, there were reports that Soviet pilots took part in dogfights with Israeli planes. And yet, the United States and the West in general were prepared to develop détente with the USSR. Moreover, public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic seemed, with few exceptions, to be enthusiastic about a new rapprochement with the Soviet communist power. Not so any more. If the German treaties, the Four Power agreement on Berlin, and SALT I were political symbols of the beginning of the 1970s, the 1980s started with the crisis of Afghanistan, growing tension in the Persian Gulf, and sharp mutual accusations connected with the Polish situation. Nothing could be more symbolic of the sorry state of the East-West relationship than the polemics at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This conference, initiated by the Soviet bloc in the 1960s but launched in the 1970s, was intended to lead to a reduction in European tension, greater economic cooperation, and more exchange programs. The current review meeting in Madrid, however, has turned out to be more of a show trial, with the USSR and her allies in the Dimitri K. Simes is Executive Director of the Soviet and East European Research Program of The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. He was formerly Director of Soviet Studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before immigrating to the United States in 1973, he was a research associate with the USSR Academy of Sciences. 57 58 SAIS REVIEW defendant's box because ofthe Russian intervention in Afghanistan and suppression of Soviet and East European dissent. The defendants may very well be guilty. Still, who would suggest that this landslide of charges and countercharges indeed contributes to security and cooperation between East and West, supposedly the objective of the whole venture? Both sides have long lists of grievances. The United States has a good case for arguing that American unilateral restraint on arms production and deployment did not have visible impact on the pace of the Soviet military buildup. As a result, the military balance—SALT and détente notwithstanding—has shifted considerably in Moscow's favor. Second on the list ofAmerican disillusionments is Soviet expansion in the Third World. Starting with the 1975 Soviet-Cuban role^in the Angolan civil war, Moscow has increasingly developed the habit of using proxy forces, and later in Afghanistan, its own troops, as an arbiter ofThird World disputes. In the process, the Kremlin is charged with acting as if Russia were the only superpower and as if American interests and even explicit warnings were not to be taken seriously. Third, while few responsible Americans reduce the numerous U.S. misfortunes in the Third World to Soviet subversion and intrigues, there is an impressive body of evidence to suggest that on many occasions Moscow had an almost instinctive tendency to offer a helping hand to forces challenging the United States. The precise role of private and public Soviet advice in support of the 1973 oil embargo and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices or of the contribution of provocative Soviet broadcasts to the seizing of American hostages is impossible to evaluate. Clearly, in the majority ofsituations, indigenous players were pursuing their own interests, which just happened to coincide with Soviet suggestions. Still, if the extent of Soviet input into American troubles in the Third World is often in doubt, the hostile intent— blatant pursuit ofa zero-sum game where American losses equal Soviet gains—is on the record and impossible to deny. While the new American...