The United States and Democracy in Chile (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 193 testing of the analyses in diese two studies, we can improve on American economic and political strategies in die Asia Pacific region. Navigators who do not judiciously trim their sails risk much. The United States and Democracy in Chile. By Paul E. Sigmund. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 214 pp. $38.95/Hardcover, $13.95/Softcover. Reviewed by Catherine Förster. Ms. Forster holds a BA from Duke University and is an MA candidate at SAIS. Prior to 1973, Chile had experienced almost 150 years ofuninterrupted civilian constitutional rule, a fact which clearly distinguishes Chile from all of its Latin American counterparts. The juxtaposition ofdiis unparalleled political stability with one ofdie most repressive and brutal military regimes in Latin America has been the subject of numerous books and academic studies. Paul Sigmund's book, TKe United States and Democracy in Chile, stands out among mis literature due to its unique perspective regarding recent Chilean history. In die book, Sigmund provides a refreshing, novel analysis of the impact of Chilean events on U.S. policy debates between 1960 and 1990. Sigmund also addresses die impact ofU.S. policy on Chile and ultimately concludes diat the United States has played a significant, aldiough not decisive, tole in Chile. His candid evaluation ofU.S. involvement in Chile, including criticism of certain actions, augment his premise diat the Chileans—not die Americans—have been the cnicial participants in the dramatic events diat have occurred in Chile since 1960. Sigmund begins his assessment of the U.S.-Chilean relationship in the early 1960s widi the establishment of die U.S. Alliance for Progress. Through diis initiative, introduced under President Kennedy, die United States provided public and private loans and investments to Latin American countries in an effort to facilitate economic and social development and promote democracy. Chile was selected by the United States as a showcase model ostensibly for its history ofcivilian constitutional rule and its desire to implement social and economic reforms. However, die existence of a strong socialist/communist parry that regarded a Cuban-like revolution as die solution to the poverty in Chile was probably a more realistic reason. Sigmund reveals die increasing involvement ofthe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Chilean affairs diroughout die 1960s, and die growing interaction between the two governments over Chilean budget issues. During diis time period, the United States strongly encouraged President Frei (1964-1970) to implement a radical agrarian reform program. Sigmund claims diat this may have been one instance where U.S. influence produced a direcdy negative impact, in that this 1967 reform heightened die polarization in Chile diat contributed to Allende's victory in 1970. Sigmund lucidly delineates die policy conundrum of the United States before and after die election of Salvador Allende. The root of the problem was diat die 194 SAIS Review WINTER-SPRING 1994 United States viewed Allende as a communist (he was in fact a socialist) whose election signified a threat to U.S. national security. The election in 1970 between Salvador Allende, Radomiro Tomic and Jorge Alessandri did not result in the immediate election of Allende since he did not receive a majority of die vote. In situations such as this when a candidate does not receive a majority of the vote, the Chilean constitution stipulates diat Congress choose between the two top contenders fifty days after the original election. Traditionally, die Chilean Congress had always voted for the front runner, which in this case was Allende. Therefore, the United States decided to use diis 50-day period to try and prevent die election of Allende, despite the fact that it would involve the United States in strategies to bar a freely elected democratic president from taking office. As a result of diis decision, a group entided The Forty Commission, comprised ofmembers ofdie State Department and die CIA, developed two strategies. The first referred to as Track I or the "Frei Gambit", consisted of massive support—including bribery—for a proposal from die opposing candidate, Alessandri. This proposal, which stated that Alessandri would resign ifCongress elected him in order to create a new election, was an attempt to win the support ofthe Christian Democratic...