Needed: A Framework for European Security

NEEDED: A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY Stefan Fröhlich With die end ofthe Cold War, Europe is likely to face a resumption ofmany historical tensions diat were suppressed in the postwar era, as well as new sources of instability. Despite all efforts to encourage democratic and market reforms in die former Soviet Union—almost certainly the most important region affecting Europe's security—and to use diplomacy to manage the lesser crises in Europe, contingencies are even more likely to arise now dian in die past in which Western Europe may need to employ, or at least must have a convincing option to employ, military force. Nowhere is die need for military cooperation more apparent than in die former state of Yugoslavia. The war has shown, however, mat neidier die collective defense system ofdie North Adantic Treaty Organization (nato) nor the economic integration efforts of die European Community (EC) have been truly effective in responding to security challenges. Thus any contingencies will require not merely appropriate military responses, but also attention to die political framework widiin which diose responses should be organized. The Maastricht meeting, atwhich diis issue was confronted in late 1991, provided only a provisional answer, and die danget remains diat die Adantic and European perspectives ofthe European security framework will prove to be incompatible. In adjusting to die challenges brought about by die end of die Cold War, die members ofdie Western security structure face three critical tasks: creating a new strategic rationale for die Alliance; deciding how to contribute to stability in die Stefan Fröhlich is an assistant professor in die Department of Political Science, University of Bonn. He received his Ph.D. from Bonn University in 1989 after having studied in Paris, Philadelphia, and Bonn. From 1 985 to 1 989, Dr. Fröhlich was a research assistant in the German Bundestag. He is the author of The United States and the New World Order and has published numerous articles. 35 36 SAIS Review WINTER-SPRING 1994 larger international system; and transforming die Adantic and European institutional elements into a more coherent and effective instrument NATO's Tasks Redefined: From Rome to Brussels The Rome Summit of Heads of State and Government in November 1991 approved NATO's long-awaited definitive overhaul widi regard to several important aspects.1 Rome reaffirmed die primary purpose ofthe Alliance: to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means and to work for a just, lasting, and peaceful democratic order in Europe. Moreover, die summit restated nato's mutual security guarantee and die indispensability ofdie transadantic link for the overall stability of Europe. More important, however, nato tackled five new subjects at die Rome summit. First, it developed a comprehensive blueprint for restructuring its forces diat abandons die doctrine of forward defense and flexible response in favor of smaller, more flexible, and more mobile multinational forces, diereby sharply reducing die emphasis on die role of nuclear forces and increasing die reliance on reserves. This plan, which is almost identical with what former U.S. secretary of defense Les Aspin recendy introduced as the "Bottom-Up Review" to restructure U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War era, clearly indicates diat die future European defense identity should be compatible widi the NATO Alliance.2 Second, nato created a new structure, the North Adantic Cooperation Council (nacc), which will institutionalize a pattern of consultative relationships widi die former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet Union. The creation ofdiis structure marks a shift ofemphasis in nato away from military défense in die narrow sense and toward a general involvement in die security and stability of Eastern and Central Europe. Subjects to be included in this rapprochement are security issues, including defense planning and peacekeep1 North Adantic Treaty Organization, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation ("Rome Declaration"), NATO Press Communique Sl (91) 86 (Brussels: November 7, 1991) and Neu· Strategic Concept, NATO Press Communique S-I (91) 85 (Brussels: November 7, 1991). The summit did end, though, with some compromises and ambiguous statements, an outcome which underlines the Alliance's difficulty in reaching consensus on a thorough redefinition of NATO's post-Cold War role. 2...