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BOOK REVIEWS 159 Fiebig-von Hase's provocative discussion ofthe conflicts that arose at the turn of the century between Germany and the United States over Latin America is the heart of her book, but it comprises only about half of its bulk. The rest is concerned with subjects about which Fiebig-von Hase is not an expert, such as U.S. policy in the region and the internal politics of Latin American countries. This would not be a serious criticism, except that Fiebig-von Hase's (and her editor's) failure to shape and hone her book has lost it many potential readers, and, I suppose, an eager translator. This is a great loss, for the essence of her book deserves a wide audience. Her superbly documented discussion of German policy in Latin America is without equal. Seven Years in France: François Mitterand and the Unintended Revolution , 1981-1988. By Julius W. Friend. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 249pp. Cloth. Reviewed by Françoise M. Taylor, Ph.D., Coordinator, French Program, SAIS. More than two years ago, François Mitterand began his second term. It is already clear, as is often the case with second terms, that it will prove a greater test than the first one. Already, the presidential image has deteriorated significantly, and the days of presidential infallibility appear to be over. The Socialists suffer from a loss of political identity, scandals tarnish their image, would-be heirs fight over Mitterand's succession, and the gap between the "pay réel" and the "pays légal" increases. In addition, the seemingly unstoppable rise of the National Front, the problem of immigration, and the high rate of unemployment are but a few of the challenges Mitterand will face during his remaining years as head of state. Mitterand's first term, as described by Julius Friend, was also filled with challenges. Yet while these challenges were undoubtedly difficult for him to overcome, their nature was less tricky. Friend refers to an unintended revolution which constituted the main paradox of Mitterand's first term: the Socialists might not have come to power were it not for their generously Utopian, remotely Marxist, platform. On the other hand, they remained in power and transformed French society only by retreating from these very principles. The result was the loss of Socialist identity. Friend gives a factual as well as an analytical account of this evolution and is able to explain, briefly but convincingly, the rationale for the Socialists' conflicting positions, and the issues at stake. In particular, he makes clear the ways in which Socialist policy was initially so much out of step with other Western countries at a time of ascendant Reaganomics and Thatcherism. Friend describes in detail the steps and struggles which led to the abandonment of "socialism in a single country" and the return to mainstream economic policies. Friend's discussion of these policies is thorough and enlightening. In his chronological account of the three phases of Mitterand's first term (the Mauroy government and its 21 months on the Left; the return to economic reality; the 160 SAIS REVIEW move toward the Center with Laurent Fabius and the "cohabitation" of Chirac-Mitterand), the author includes analyses of certain aspects of French political and cultural background, which facilitate an understanding of this period. He explores the Le Pen phenomenon, detailing this man's surprising appeal to voters with insight and an in depth understanding of the complex motivations of Le Pen's followers. However, this section needs to be completed and updated, as it leaves out recent events (e.g., the Creil affair, the Socialists' acknowledgement of the problem of immigration) that proved important in launching the National Front into a new and more mainstream phase of development. Friend's account ofFrance's intellectual life is somewhat less convincing. His claim that the seizure ofSolzhenitsyn's manuscript of The GulagArchipelago marks the beginning of a major revision ofattitudes within the French Left wing intelligentsia is debatable. When this happened in 1973, Soviet communism had long since lost its appeal for intellectuals, whose sympathies began to switch toward Cuban and Chinese communism in the mid-1960s. The break-up was consummated...

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