New Terms of Engagement

NEW TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT. Michael Brenner C,' omparing the contending views of the United States' position as a world power that are currently in circulation, one is reminded of the Indian fable about the blind men and the elephant: The creature's nature and condition seem very different depending on which part of its being you grab hold. The "declinists" discern a clear loss of strength and other dangerous signs that the body is straining to maintain a burden of commitments beyond the capacity of its less-than-resilient constitution. To them, the creature no longer seems able to carry on as leader of the herd while competing with its more active former dependents for its share of forage. Others note an unmistakable weariness appearing in the body politic after five decades of strenuous exertion and a yearning for a less demanding regimen now that the main threats have receded. A contrasting appraisal is given by those who, marveling at the remarkable muscle-tone exhibited in the audaciously bold military move into the Persian Gulf, stress its unique capacity for continuing as an energetic taskmaster; they are equally impressed by the willingness of friends and allies to respond to its vigorous lead. Finally, a group ofupbeat diagnosticians offers the encouraging prognosis that, with a little more attention to diet and a more judicious handling of its leadership duties, there is no good reason why it paternalistically cannot go on supervising the Michael Brenner is professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. His recent writings on U.S. foreign policy and alliance relations include articles in Foreign Policy, Politique Étrangère, and Polity. 11 12 SAISREVIEW collective affairs ofits stable dominion—especially because there is no one else around who is able to assume the stewardship. Reality eludes each of our consulting physicians and their prescriptions are consequently inadequate. It is not because they are wrong in describing what they see. Rather, their fault is in judging an entire condition, and providing counsel, based on the findings of a partial diagnosis. Truth is always multifaceted, and nowhere is it more so than in assessing the present purposes and capabilities ofthe United States as a player in the world arena. The hallmarks of today's conditions are an irregular terrain and a blurring of established landmarks, and the situation does not yield itself to ready formulations or crisp statements of U.S. interests and strategy. What is undeniable is that the events of the past year are resulting in a redrawing of the global geostrategic map. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet military threat, new perspectives are developing about the United States' engagement in the international arena. This process of reappraisal has been given point and urgency by the Persian Gulf crisis. The latter has intercepted in mid-flight the intellectual adjustment to the Cold War's demise, adding yet another set of coordinates to complicate an already demanding task ofnavigation. Setting a new course for U.S. foreign policy has been doubly complicated. The Gulf crisis not only has belied the sanguine forecasts that force is becoming obsolete in international life and that the world's political affairs now lend themselves to routine management ; it also has highlighted two discrepant features of the international landscape: the differentiated nature ofpower, in particular the disparities between its politico-military and its politico-economic dimensions, and the uneven distribution of responsibilities among the United States and its major allies in Western Europe and Japan. Together these features reinforce the conclusion that the end of the Cold War has thrown wide-open the issue of how the United States should involve itself in world affairs. Three sets of questions will help frame the principal issues involved in an assessment of the United States' international role. * What are the U.S. stakes in the world now that the challenges of spearheading the resistance to communism and of containing Soviet power are rapidly waning? * Does U.S. power correspond to residual U.S. interests and responsibilities ? What operational significance do conventional indices of military and economic power have when interstate relations institutionalize many U.S. national interests...