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BOOK REVIEWS 189 ofnuclear deterrence and how to proceed in negotiations with Moscow on limiting strategic arms. For instance, Seaborg's account of the discussion between Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at the 1967 Glassboro Summit (where the broad tradeoffs finalized in the SALT I agreement were first broached) is embarrassingly cursory, consisting largely of a verbatim reprint of the record. The reader might erroneously infer that Seaborg was not privy to the deliberations about U.S. nuclear policy. Finally, this volume is marred by a glaring factual misstatement that the U.S. has never deployed anti-ballistic missile defenses, as well as by several questionable assertions in the epilogue. The most egregious is that the American military establishment views arms control as a wholesale threat to its institutional interests, a proposition that is simplistic and unworthy of a scholar of Seaborg's credentials. Indeed, in his epilogue, he seems more concerned with castigating the policies of the Reagan administration than with offering a studied analysis of the arms control legacy of theJohnson administration. Furthermore, an assessment of the contemporary state of the global nonproliferation regime—a natural progression from the book's main focus—is altogether missing. In short, this volume is decidedly uneven. It is recommended as a detailed narrative of the making of the Nonproliferation Treaty; scholars, however, are advised to look elsewhere for information on other aspects of arms control diplomacy of the Johnson era. U.S. Commercial Opportunities in the Soviet Union. By Chris C. and Brinda Z. Carvounis. New York: Quorum Books, 1989. 192 pp. Reviewed by Dan Berg, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. Mikhail Gorbachev would like the Soviet Union to right itself, but he understands that isolation only complicates the task. Hoping to attract Western involvement and capital for the perestroïka campaign, he has supported an array of reforms, the most prominent of which are "On Measures to Improve the Management of Foreign Economic Ties" (January 1987) and the "Law on the State Enterprise" (June 1987). The above reforms discuss enterprise autonomy, ownership regulations and international economic relations, and allude to currency convertibility and a floating price system. Though making economic interaction easier and possibly more profitable, these changes also raise questions (and eyebrows) for American firms who would be remiss to leave unexplored any possible area of profit in an age of increased international competition. U. S. Commercial Opportunities in the Soviet Union is an important text because, as the Soviet Union unveils itself, American firms are finding themselves extremely disadvantaged. Although the authors do not propose to present a historical survey, even their short review makes clear that barriers to trade relations exist on both sides; after all, Soviet ideology once crusaded against 190 SAIS REVIEW capitalist evils such as Western goods and investment. Pragmatism as well forced Soviet leaders to avoid dependence on uncertain Western sources. American partners, whose goods came with political baggage, were particularly shunned. Americans created further impediments on their own. For example, since the Soviet Union lacks Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, Soviet goods cost up to ten times more than comparable imports. The Modern Critical Technology List, established by the Export Administration Act of 1979, "has been described as a 'Modern Technologies List' . . . because of its inclusiveness. Controls continue on all exports of technical data to proscribed countries, whether it be technical data to manufacture baby formula, Pampers, antibiotics, farm combines , or any other item."1 Even in times of detente, conservatives defend these obstacles as necessary evils to prevent Soviet advances. These barriers have led to today's severely atrophied bilateral trade structure . Our allies adroitly respond to the cooperation offer, while American firms have participated in only 17 of the first 256 joint ventures established on the basis on new Soviet laws.2 Against this backdrop of restrictions, the Carvounises' main task is to advise American businesspeople on the intricacies of Eastern bloc/Soviet economies . Since a business executive's interest in Soviet history or in the Gorbachev phenomenon are secondary, they move quickly to the big question: How can American entrepreneurs make a profit in the Soviet Union? However, the list of perplexing corollary questions is continually growing: Which fields...

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