Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 237 book make a contribution to the ongoing assessment of the Reagan administration 's record in Latin America, which according to Farer, should receive very low marks. Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. By Robert A. Pastor. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 392 pp. $24.95/cloth. Reviewed by Claudia Franco Hijuelos, Ph.D. candidate, SAIS. The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 undoubtedly constituted an important landmark in the relationship between the United States and its Central American "backyard." Robert Pastor's Condemned to Repetition adds firsthand knowledge of events during the Carter years to the growing number of interpretations of U.S. -Nicaraguan relations. As former director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs on the National Security Council from 1977 to 1981, Pastor presents a descriptive and informative account, with lengthy memorandum-like reports on the proceedings of National Security Council meetings. In addition, Pastor offers sweeping conclusions that lead to the development of policy recommendations. His book contributes valuable insights into the shifts in U.S. foreign policy during a crisis of political instability and flux in an area where U.S. interests have traditionally gone uncontested. Pastor believes that the repetitive pattern of U.S. policy toward the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua is not adequately explained by the U.S. fear that a hostile government in the area might undertake close relations with a rival. Rather, the U.S. government's principal problem is in identifying the threat and in the perception or misperception of U.S. objectives by the Nicaraguan government and other Central American governments. Pastor acknowledges the right of the United States to define its security in Central America and does not question the right of the United States to encourage a certain form of government in Nicaragua. It is a given, then, that certain limits will be placed on how Central American countries may conduct their domestic and foreign policies. In an attempt to avoid another Cuba in Nicaragua, the Carter administration felt compelled to "deny the Sandinistas an enemy" by seeking a modus vivendi to lead the Sandinista revolutionary government to political moderation . According to Pastor, the Sandinistas misperceived U.S. intentions and failed to tone down their anti-U.S. rhetoric. They preferred to make overtures to socialist bloc countries and aid their compañeros in El Salvador. The author provides a sample ofwhat the Sandinistas might have perceived were the U.S. government's intentions in his account of the consideration given to a plot by Nicaraguan "moderates" (led by Jorge Salazar, president of the Union of Nicaraguan Agricultural Producers) to overthrow the Sandinistas. The Carter administration learned about the plan shortly before the U.S. elections in 1980. Although the administration considered supporting it, a decision was 238 SAIS REVIEW made against it after an assessment of its chances for success and of such risks as the possibility of Cuban military action to defend the Sandinistas. Other factors contributed to the failure of U.S. policy during the Carter administration. Pastor believes that more intelligence information would have helped U.S. officials make effective policy decisions from the beginning. For example, as late as one month before Somoza was overthrown, the United States was unaware of the Sandinistas' power to defeat the Somoza regime. Furthermore , Carter's attention was occupied by the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which consumed much of his energy. Pastor provides thorough recommendations to manage similar problems in the future. He stresses the need for multilateral strategies "to deal with dictatorships in crises of political succession," for an international electionmonitoring organization, and even for the granting of incentives to dictators to leave power, since "few fallen dictators have found a tranquil place to live out their days, and this cannot help but affect the decisions of incumbent dictators ." Pastor rejects Reagan's confrontational policies. The funding of the Contras, Pastor believes, served only to encourage moderate elements within Nicaragua to join the violent opposition. The fruits of the Sandinistas' overtures toward Cuba and the Soviet Union, which Pastor denounces as one of their earliest faux pas, have been insufficient to offset the...