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BOOK REVIEWS 273 academic who is concerned with relationships among nations, the book is oversimplified : the concepts are self-evident yet lack insight, the language is catchy yet lacks sophistication, the goal —constructing a relationship that can deal with differences— is desirable but ultimately begs the question of plausibility. In sum, the recipe is appealing and the ingredients seem acceptable enough, but while the potential for error is avoided by the authors, it is, in practice, simply unavoidable. No matter how well the recipe is followed, the ingredients chosen, carefully measured and combined, sunken souffle and burnt brownies may well result. Likewise, no matter how closely a reader follows Fisher and Brown's prescriptions for an "unconditionally constructive" relationship, the result may still be an unavoidably destructive relationship. It is this aspect of effective relationship-building that most deserves attention in international politics , but which is least of all addressed in Getting Together. The questions— What do we do when the relationship will not "work"? What happens when we simply cannot "get together"?—go unanswered. The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story ofIsrael's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair. By Samuel Segev. New York: The Free Press, 1988. 340 pp. $22.50/cloth. Reviewed by Malcolm Byrne, SAIS M.?., 1986. One of the great unknowns in the Iran-Contra affair is the exact nature of the role played by Israel. The simple reason is that none of the official investigations into the scandal chose to examine the issue in depth. In fact, the congressional Iran-Contra committee went so far as to cut a deal with Israel not to subpoena Israeli officials, agents, or documentation in exchange for the provision by Jerusalem of two chronologies of events, the value of which was questioned by some committee staff. As a result, the congressional inquiry had to rely primarily on American accounts of the motivations and performance of Israeli agents. Predictably, the Israeli government has preferred to close the book on the issue, pronouncing itself satisfied with the congressional probe. Ironically, not everyone on the Israeli side is entirely satisfied. The principal malcontents are among the key group of Israelis who participated in the first phase of the Iran arms deals and who were not flattered by American descriptions of their conduct. The so-called "troika," which was active throughout much of 1985, consisted of Yaacov Nimrodi, a long-time Israeli military attaché to Iran under the Shah; Adolph (Al) Schwimmer, retired head of Israel Aircraft Industries; and David Kimche, a former high-ranking official of Mossad and, during the arms initiative, the director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry . The troika helped manage the first three arms transfers to Iran in 1985, but after a disastrous attempt to ship 80 HAWK missiles in November of that year, they were unceremoniously removed from the initiative so that the United States could exert more direct control. It is clear from Segev's opinions about this and other aspects of the operation, and from the first-hand sources he is able to draw upon, that members of the troika have found a voice in The Iranian Triangle. 274 SAIS REVIEW Segev's basic premise is that the Iran initiative was a worthwhile undertaking for all three sides of the triangle (Iran, Israel, and the United States) but that a series ofmajor errors, above all the inclusion of Oliver North, Richard Secord, and Israeli official Amiram Nir in the deals, invited disaster. Segev acknowledges that the interests of the United States and Israel were not entirely the same, but he quotes Kimche approvingly to the effect that there were enough points in common upon which to base a policy. Creating a strategic opening to Iran and gaining the release of hostages (American and Israeli) in Lebanon were the main shared interests, while the course of the Iran-Iraq war was the primary difference . Israel wanted the war to continue in order to drain both sides of resources they might otherwise direct against Israel. The United States' goal was to bring about an end to the conflict without either side winning a decisive victory. Segev is unabashed in his view that the troika was probably the...

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