France and European Security after the INF Treaty

FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE INF TREATY Philip Gordon -Cor the second time in this decade, Europe must sort itself out in the wake of a "Euromissile crisis." This time, the question is not whether to accept deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons — their successful and peaceful installation ended that discussion — but what their removal will mean and how best to respond to it. The Reagan-Gorbachev INF (intermediate -range nuclear forces) agreement last December is rightly being seen as a turning point in Western Europe's postwar defense narrative, and policymakers across the Continent are asking what this treaty, and the trends it symbolizes, means for the security of their countries. Nowhere is reappraisal more serious or more consequential than in France, where the degree of high-level and public debate, diplomacy, and military handwringing in the wake of recent developments has been considerable. Even in a country known for its defense "consensus" and its stubborn clinging to General Charles de Gaulle's military policies, the changing security environment has led to anything but continuity. Instead , France has begun to reexamine and even revise existing policies, to consider, enhance, or create alliances with different European partners , and to study military options more closely than ever. The main focus of these deliberations has been, not surprisingly, the role France can and should play in a West European defense that is more independent from the United States. Since the Reagan administration first began seriously courting its Kremlin counterpart late last year, leaders in Paris have begun to take note of other ominous signs that the U.S. contribution to European security cannot be taken for granted. Even though many observers, in France as elsewhere, have long Philip Gordon is a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS. 191 192 SAIS REVIEW decried Atlantic-NATO's obsolescence, fading confidence in the old system finally has produced a truly significant mood for action. Two fundamental trends underlie the pressure for change: not only is the U.S. role in European defense increasingly under strain, but the forty-year foundation of this defense— nuclear deterrence—is itselfcoming into widespread question. When such Europeans as Bavarian FranzJosef Strauss visit Moscow to declare that "the postwar era is over," and in the United States such strategists as Edward Luttwak pronounce the same fate for "the nuclear era," it is likely that serious change is taking place.1 No one can be sure what the new atmosphere will produce, but clearly both of these processes — "de-Americanization" and "denuclearization " — are already having a strong effect on the organization of European defense. Furthermore, in whatever formula emerges, the French role will be a key one. France's status as an increasingly potent nuclear power, its potential contribution of soldiers, money, and space on the central front, and the present opportunity to assume a long-desired leadership role in an independent Europe are all facets of France's importance for Europe's defense in the 1990s. The following assessment of the French contribution to European security, given the weakening foundations of traditional strategy outlined above, addresses some central questions: How have changes in the European defense balance affected the French role, and what are the implications of those changes? How has France responded to the indications that European defense must be both less nuclear and more European? Finally, considering France's means and political situation, what can be expected from the leadership in Paris in the months and years to come? The European Context Any discussion of the French role in the defense of Western Europe must take place within the context of the military blocs facing one another on the Continent. Notwithstanding France's dogmatic insistence upon indépendance and its watered-down commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, France's fate is inevitably tied to that of its European partners. It is, of course, hard to imagine any major military conflict in Europe that would not involve the French, and even more difficult to see how the French army could be engaged in isolation. Historically, however, French forces have never been fundamental to the security of the NATO alliance. In the early postwar period the bulk 1 For Strauss...