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  • Pouvoir et Religion: pour reconcilier l'histoire et l'anthropologie
  • Christopher Taylor
Luc de Heusch, Pouvoir et Religion: pour reconcilier l'histoire et l'anthropologie. Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2009. 216 pp.

This is Luc de Heusch's most ambitious book to date. In it he discusses sub-Saharan African kingship, for which he prefers the term "sacred kingship" instead of the more usual "divine kingship," but he also briefly considers the kingship systems of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, China, India, and South America to which he does apply the term "divine kingship." From there, he takes on the question of monotheism and its relation to the kingship systems in which it was born. Finally, the work closes with a stimulating chapter on the social contract where he contrasts the thoughts of Rousseau and Hobbes. This book, although probably not suited for most undergraduate courses, is well worth a careful read from serious scholars. Because these latter are relatively few in number, it is unlikely that this book will be translated into English any time soon, though it certainly merits it.

Despite the passionate criticism and debate provoked by his earlier books such as: Le Rwanda et la Civilisation Interlacustre (1966), Le Roi Ivre [End Page 585] (1972), Rois Nés d'un Coeur de Vache (1982), and Le Roi de Kongo et les monstres sacrés (2000), de Heusch remains committed to the analytical methods of French structuralism and to the proposition that the diverse manifestations of African sacred kingship are logically and historically related, constituting a transformational system (système de transformation). In such a system, the fundamental symbolic and cognitive armature of kingship is retained from one area to the next and from one time period to the next, although the constituent elements may change their valuations, valences, and overall configuration. Furthermore, individual symbolic elements are to be interpreted in relation to one another as parts of a system rather than as bearers of meaning in themselves, as would be more the case with linguistic signs. This is a proposition that is faithful to the thinking of Claude Levi-Strauss, whose influence is clear. The book's other significant influence is that of James Frazer, whose monumental opus, The Golden Bough, preceded structuralism by over a half century, but which made a point dear to structuralism—that a single prototypical form can generate dozens of related variants.

The subtitle of this book, which could be translated as "towards reconciling history and anthropology," is likely to prove controversial, for many scholars have rejected and will continue to reject any possible contribution that structuralism might bring to historical knowledge.

These latter will continue to characterize structuralism and its notion of transformation as "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." This characterization is unwarranted when one considers that the change structuralists talk about is of a logical nature and is not directly evenemential. Historians prefer to deal with concrete events that are political, economic, or religious. They are less patient with abstractions transforming into other abstractions. Although Fernand Braudel and others of the Annales school depart from this by manifesting an interest in structure, their notion of structure is empirical while that of French structuralism is cognitive. This, of course, leaves open the question of how structures change—the actual events that lead to a transformation in any given symbolic system. Marshall Sahlins deals with such questions in much of his later work, but for the most part Luc de Heusch does not. It is likely, therefore, that the usual objections raised against structuralism concerning contingency, agency, and context will not be laid to rest with this book.

Structuralism performs some analytical tasks and answers some questions quite well, but there are others which it addresses less well or not at [End Page 586] all. But the same could be said of just about every theoretical tendency and analytical method in the social sciences. The perfect theory does not and will never exist. Advocates of a particular theory expend enormous energy debating points with advocates of other theories, but usually their disagreements come down to questions of taste. The...

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