Promoting Change in South Africa: The United States Searches for a New Role

PROMOTING CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE UNITED STATES SEARCHES FOR A NEW ROLE Herman W. Nickel m hen Congress overrode the president's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, October 2, 1986, public interest in the South African issue declined sharply. The final passage of the act seemed to satisfy, at least temporarily, the need many Americans felt to "send a message" that would tangibly demonstrate their indignation at the images ofrepression that had flashed across their television screens night after night, month after month. Unfortunately, the fading American interest does not in any way reflect an improvement in the South African situation. Quite the opposite is the case. The state ofemergency has been tightened; thousands of black activists, includingjuveniles, remain in detention without trial. The liberal Progressive Federal party (PFP), which had worked for many of the steps demanded by the antiapartheid act, fared worst in the May 1987 elections for the white chamber of parliament. It has lost its status as the official opposition to the far-Right Conservative party, which accuses the government of moving too far too fast on the road to reform. Close to half of Afrikanerdom, the traditional voting base for the ruling National party, now stands to the right of State President P.W. Botha's government. The pace of reform has slowed markedly, as indicated by the government's refusal to repeal the Group Areas Act, mandating residential segregation. The government's preoccupation with security blocks progresses toward a political dialogue with the black majority. Repression has reduced the level of township unrest, along with hopes for a successful revolution in the foreseeable future. But none of the underlying causes for the unrest—notably Herman W. Nickel is diplomat-in-residence at TheJohns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. He was U.S. ambassador to South Africa from April 1982 to October 1986. 29 30 SAIS REVIEW the exclusion of the black majority from the central political system— has been addressed. The lid has been put firmly on the kettle, but underneath the grievances and the anger continue to simmer. Keeping the camera crews out, a technique that worked so well for the Soviets in the much bloodier conflict in Afghanistan, has also worked for the South African government. The nightly images ofSouth African police officers swinging theirsjamboks at black youths have vanished from Americans ' television screens and been replaced by other political dramas closer to home, such as the Iran-Contra hearing or the Robert Bork confirmation battle. The flagging ofU.S. public interest following the sanctions vote demonstrates that it is easier for Americans to vent their indignation through a single legislative gesture than to deal constructively and in a sustained way with the intractable problems of Africa's most critical region. By repudiating the policy of constructive engagement and replacing it with symbolism, Congress has put U.S. policy toward southern Africa in disarray. The Wrong Signals What in domestic political terms was virtually cost free for the United States (only opposition to sanctions carried real political risks) now carries a considerable price tag in foreign policy terms. U.S. influence, never as great as many concerned Americans and the victims of apartheid imagined it to be, has been reduced to a new low. If the threat ofsanctions or an incentive for a better relationship with the United States ever placed inhibitions on the South African government, these have largely disappeared. Access to the South African government, still the most powerful player in the South African drama, has become even more difficult, especially regarding human rights matters, which the government views as a domestic affair. Regionally, South Africa arrogates the right to pursue its enemies across established international borders. It defines its own security needs in ways that mean insecurity and destabilization to its neighbors. Whether the United States can effectively pursue the regional peace process under these circumstances, especially as it relates to Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, remains very much in doubt. White South Africans, rightly or wrongly, generally care little about American reactions, thinking they have more to do with how Americans want to feel about themselves than about the problems of South Africa. In the wake of...