Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Aquino Was Right

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES: AQUINO WAS RIGHT Gareth Porter Oince President Corazón Aquino took office in February 1986 the issue of how to handle the communist insurgency has been the source of intense political struggle within the Philippines as well as of tension between the Aquino government and the Reagan administration. Aquino was convinced that the Marcos approach of militarizing the countryside was not only a failure but a large part of the problem and that military force should be used only as a last resort. She initiated a new strategy that put primary emphasis on a cease-fire and negotiations with the communist leadership. The leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and some Reagan administration officials criticized as naive this fundamentally nonmilitary approach. Aquino's critics argued that there could be no negotiations with the insurgents without first applying military pressure on them. AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, supported by the United States, pressed Aquino to adopt a counterinsurgency plan that would combine economic and social programs with military force. U.S. officials were impatient with Aquino for continuing to negotiate through the summer and autumn of 1986. A ranking U.S. diplomat in Manila summed up the U.S. view in September by saying that it was "silly" to say you could deal with the insurgency by means of "peace talks."1 1. Interview with the author, U.S. embassy, Manila, 3 September 1986. Gareth Porter teaches Southeast Asian politics at the School of International Service, The American University. He is the author of The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines (Honolulu, Hawaii: Center for Philippine Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987). Previous publications include A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975) and Vietnam: A History in Documents (New York: New American Library, 1981). 93 94 SAIS REVIEW The results of Aquino's approach during the first year suggest that she was right and her detractors wrong. Aquino's initiative for negotiations and a cease-fire shifted the struggle to political posturing by both sides to gain the advantage. There was a sharp reduction in the level of insurgency-related casualties from March to December,2 followed by a sixty-day cease-fire during which the killing was brought practically to a halt. The growth of the armed strength of the New People's Army (NPA) was virtually stopped, and the Communist party of the Philippines (CPP) and its underground political front, the National Democratic Front (NDF), made no organizational gains that could have been denied by military pressures. Perhaps most important, the political approach opened up severe internal strains within the communist movement over the proper strategic response. In the wake of the impressive 77 percent approval of the constitution in the 2 February plebiscite and the failure of the CPP to extend the sixty-day cease-fire, the Aquino government prepared to negotiate cease-fires with some regional CPP and NPA leaders while concentrating its forces on certain areas. Manila thus seemed to be combining Aquino's political approach with military operations in a single strategy. Nevertheless , the tension between Aquino's preference for restraining military force and the AFP command's insistence on military pressure on the insurgency is likely to continue. Both the political and military approaches to counterinsurgency have their drawbacks for the Aquino government. The success of the political approach would depend on demonstrating to the CPP leadership that resuming armed struggle is too politically risky. That task would challenge even the most brilliant political tactician. Moreover, restraints on military operations expose Aquino to partisan attack and create serious political strains between the AFP and the civilian government. Authorizing the AFP to carry out a campaign against the NPA obviously would have the full support of the military establishment and the United States. The plans and programs for such a campaign are already waiting to be implemented. However, the likelihood of success appears slight for a number of reasons. It is doubtful that offensive military operations could make a significant dent in the NPA because the NPA has already built a large enough popular political base to...