The Reykjavík Summit and European Security

THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT_ AND EUROPEAN SECURITY David S. Yost ML my West Europeans have agreed in retrospect that the most disturbing feature of the Reykjavik summit was the apparent "indifference or quasi-indifference" of the United States regarding European security interests .1 This judgment is based on the specific arms-control arrangements that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed in Iceland in October 1986, plus the subsequent explanations of the U.S. administration. The Reykjavik summit also provided fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's more imaginative diplomatic style under Gorbachev and, more substantively, ofenduring Soviet preferences regarding security in Europe. Although West Europeans have expressed concerns about Soviet motives and about U.S. competence and long-term reliability, they have reached little consensus about practical steps that governments should take. In public declarations the West Europeans have generally professed to be pleased with the arms-control measures discussed at Reykjavik. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all the allies except France and Iceland, asserted in October 1986: "We extended our warm appreciation to the President on his conduct of the talks and fully endorsed his bold attempt to seek far-reaching arms control agreements 1. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, "Pour une expression de solidarité européenne," Le Monde, 8 November 1986, 4. David S. Yost is an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and a 1986-87 visiting scholar at SAIS. Dr. Yost worked in the Department of Defense, primarily in the Office of Net Assessment, in 1984-86 under the auspices of fellowships from NATO and the Council on Foreign Relations. He would like to express his appreciation to the Earhart Foundation for research support. The views expressed are his alone and should not be construed to represent those of the Department of the Navy or any U.S. government agency. 1 2 SAIS REVIEW with the Soviet Union. We fully endorsed the President's programme presented in Iceland and stressed that this programme provides the opportunity for historic progress."2 Subsequent reports and Alliance deliberations have made it clear, however, that this communiqué language overstated West European support for the U.S. positions. According to Robert O'Neill, the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, "We have got into an absurd situation, where everyone in the alliance is saying exactly the opposite of what he thinks."3 West European misgivings concern four main topics: the tentative agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); the proposals for strategic force limitations, especially the U.S. plan to eliminate all ballistic missiles in ten years; the goal of complete nuclear disarmament; and conflicting views on future limitations on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces According to a standard Western definition, there are two basic categories of INF missiles: shorter-range INF(SRINF) with ranges between 150 and 1,000 kilometers, such as the Soviet SS- 12/22 and SS-23 and longer-range INF (LRINF), with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers, such as the Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 and U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. Missiles with ranges below 150 kilometers, such as the U.S. Lance and Soviet FROG/SS-21 systems, are not SRINF but simply short-range nuclear forces (SNF). At Reykjavik the United States accepted a Soviet offer to endorse a version of the global zero option for U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles that was first proposed by the United States in 1981. The Soviet-proposed zero option called for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles on European soil. The Soviet Union would retain no more than 100 warheads on LRINF missile launchers in Asia, the United States no more than the same total on U.S. soil. Despite their presummit indications, the Soviets announced at Reykjavik that no LRINF agreement could be firmly concluded unless the United States and the Soviet Union had also come to terms on a package of limits on strategic forces and space and defense systems, including new constraints on U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. Soviet spokesmen added that the Soviet Union could not...