The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy, and: Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension (review)

170 SAISREVIEW The Military Committee ofthe North Atlantic Alliance: A Study ofStructure and Strategy. By Douglas L. Bland. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. 288 pp. $47.95/Hardcover. Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension. By Robert S. Jordan. New York: St. Martins Press, 1990. 182 pp. $45.00/Hardcover. Reviewed by Jonathan T. Dworken, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. "Allies are a tiresome lot," noted British general Sir William Robertson in recalling attempts to coordinate the Allies during the First World War. It seems little has changed—coordinating America's allies was difficult in the First World War and has been ever since. As the Soviet threat disappears, dealing with America's NATO partners may become even more "tiresome" than it has been over the last forty years. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the dismantling of Soviet military power, and the breakup of the Soviet state have prompted a reappraisal of NATO's strategy and forces. It is now only a matter of time before U.S. partial disengagement and increased European confidence call into question the very structure of NATO, pushing it to become more "European." Both books reviewed here shed light on NATO's evolving structure and may be useful in considering changes to it. Douglas Bland's The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance reviews the history of the structures of Western military alliances, explains the workings ofNATO's military committee, and considers alternative arrangements. The historical review is interesting because it shows how statesmen and military leaders have made use of historical lessons. The Supreme War Council of the First World War made the Allies aware ofthe prerequisites for cooperation: close coordination in all areas, the involvement of the heads of government, dedicated staffs and an established hierarchy. Franco-British efforts to coordinate from 1939 to 1940 failed, but they were useful in eliciting a vital lesson: unity of command requires a structure separate from the national staffs in order to build a solid consensus and "strategic coherence." NATO's Military Committee, the embodiment of the lessons from years of attempted cooperation, is an integral part of the alliance. The author describes it in detail. Although officially composed of the Chiefs of Defense of NATO members other than France and Iceland, most of its work is done by the permanent representatives of the national military staffs. Its duties are to give military guidance to the North Atlantic Council and the Defense Planning Council, as well as direction to the major NATO commanders (MNCs), which are allocated NATO's forces. The three MNCs—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Supreme Allied CommanderAtlantic (SACLANT) and the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCCHAN)—are responsible to the Military Committee for their defense plans, force requirements, deployments and exercises. Within the Military Committee, coordination and planning are divided into functional areas, such as intelligence, operations, and logistics. BOOK REVIEWS 171 According to Bland, pressures to "Europeanize" NATO require a response. He argues that simply appointing a European SACEUR would be inadvisable because it would further alienate smaller members and would be oflittle help in convincing Congress to keep the U.S. engaged. Furthermore, the appointment of such a SACEUR, who would probably be British or German, would not be an appropriate response to the shifting threat from the Central front to the Southern flank. Instead, Bland recommends keeping the Military Committee and its role but making substantial changes in the MNCs which are responsible to it. The U.S., which currently heads two MNCs (SACEUR and SACLANT), would modify its position within NATO from "managing protector to supporting ally." Modeled on a 1949 plan by Canadian Chief of Staff General Charles Foulkes, Bland's concept envisions five regional MNCs: Northern European, Central European, Southern European, SACLANT, and Strategic Reserve. Nations in each region would be grouped together and would develop and be responsible for doctrine, planning and defense. The three European MNCs would be supported by SACLANT and the Strategic Reserve Command, both dominated by the U.S. Whereas Bland's book examines NATO's overall structure, Robert Jordan's Alliance Strategy and Navies focuses exclusively on the structure...