Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935-1953 (review)

During the first half of the 20th century, a serious naval power was one that possessed the means to maintain or contest control of waters beyond its immediate coastline. For much of this period, the heavily armored surface capital ship was not only the symbol, but also the substantive foundation of armed force on the high seas. Up until World War II, the battleship possessed a combination of offensive and defensive strength superior to that of any other type of warship. Battleship squadrons supported by aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines constituted a "balanced fleet." In the late 1930s, three nations — the United States, Great Britain, and Japan — possessed first-class balanced fleets. Roughly speaking, this meant a surface force of from 10 to 15 battleships, 5 or more aircraft carriers, at least 35 cruisers, and 100 to 200 destroyers. At its peak pre-1941 strength, the Soviet Navy could muster no more than three battleships, eight cruisers, and 20 destroyers, many of which were obsolete. During World War II, much of this force was sunk or badly damaged. Wartime naval construction consisted for the most part of light craft to support military operations in coastal waters. After the war, what remained of the pre-war fleet was reinforced by many new cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The resulting force was larger and stronger than it had been before World War II, but it lacked not only modern battleships but aircraft carriers, which had displaced the battleship as the primary striking unit of a balanced fleet. The post-war Soviet navy was thus no match for that of the United States, its chief post-war rival, whose wartime building had included large numbers of battleships and aircraft carriers, as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

Stalin's naval ambitions were far greater than the record of actual Soviet naval achievement would indicate. His intentions, however, have long been hidden by lack of information, misinformation, and speculation. Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet provides a comprehensive and detailed description of Soviet naval building programs between 1935 and 1953, based mainly upon recently declassified internal navy studies or difficult to obtain scholarly monographs in Russian that utilized newly accessible documents. It is, as such, a work of synthesis rather than original scholarship. The co-authors are reputable. Jürgen Rohwer served in the German Navy in World War II, received his doctorate from the University of Hamburg in 1953, was Director of the Library of Contemporary History in Stuttgart from 1959 to 1989, and has published numerous articles and several books. Mikhail S. Monakov is a Captain in the Russian Navy, Chief of the History Branch/Main Staff, and appears to have had serious scholarly training. Meticulously annotated, their monograph is supported by numerous tables within the text and 70 pages of appendices that provide the service dates of virtually every commissioned warship of the Soviet Navy during the period in question. It is, in addition, illustrated with photographs of completed warships and drawings of projected vessels, the latter being plentiful and fascinating. For many, Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet will be an invaluable reference work — no less than a third of its 300 odd pages consists of statistical tables and appendices, with drawings, endnotes, and bibliography accounting for another fifth. That being said, the narrative content is substantial and revealing.

Stalin apparently decided to develop a navy based upon heavy ships that could operate far from home waters in December 1935 (58). The initial plan of April 1936 called for a fleet of 15 battleships, 53 cruisers, 162 destroyers, and 412 submarines to be ready by 1947 (63). In 1938, the navy's share of defense expenditure...