Abstract

Suspense realism claims suspense is itself a genuine, distinct emotion. While current theories of suspense are suspense realist theories, I argue for a suspense eliminativist theory according to which suspense is not itself a genuine, distinct emotion but a subspecies of an emotion, or the class comprising all and only those subspecies, chiefly demarcated by the necessity of uncertainty and primarily the province of (primarily fictional) narrative encounters. There are several prima facie compelling reasons to think suspense eliminativism is capable of grounding a theory equally if not better able to resolve the principal concerns suspense theory must address.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-329X
Print ISSN
0190-0013
Pages
pp. 121-133
Launched on MUSE
2011-04-29
Open Access
No
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