Abstract

Montaigne is almost certainly a skeptic, and it is often thought that his skepticism leads him to subscribe to moral relativism. Indeed, there are passages in the Essais that seem to support this widespread interpretation. However, in this essay the author argues that Montaigne's skepticism does not lead to moral relativism. In fact, not only does it not lead him to abandon the notion of objective moral truth, but it is precisely his skepticism that allows Montaigne to see how despite the fact that his moral objectivism is unjustifiable, it is nonetheless defensible.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-329X
Print ISSN
0190-0013
Pages
pp. 32-50
Launched on MUSE
2011-04-29
Open Access
No
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