In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Myths, Illusions and Peace
  • David Tal
Myths, Illusions and Peace, by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky. London: Viking, 2009. 366 pp. $27.95.

This book is an attack on U.S. Middle Eastern policy, mainly during the administration of George W. Bush, with suggestions for a remedy. The authors have a wealth of experience in Middle Eastern affairs. Makovsky covered the region for many years as journalist, while Ross was a White House official dealing with the Middle East from the days of George H. W. Bush, and was deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process under President Bill Clinton. At the time the book went to print, Ross had been appointed as Special Adviser to Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton for the Persian Gulf, a brief that includes Iran and southern Asia.

The book's main thesis is that U.S. Middle Eastern policy has been influenced by two schools of thought, realist and idealist, with the latter represented mainly by the neoconservatives who were dominant during the tenure of George W. Bush. Both schools base their attitudes to the Middle East on myths that, according to the authors, have hampered America's Middle Eastern policy. Makovsky and Ross seek to debunk these myths and to offer a path toward a more effective Middle Eastern policy for the United States.

One of the myths conceived by the realists was of "linkage." They argue that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and once it is resolved, peace will prevail in the Middle East. Ross and Makovsky do not deny that the Israeli-Arab conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular have a substantial impact on the Arab and Islamic countries. They emphasize, however, that peace must be also pursued for the sake of the people who are trapped amid the bloodshed, and it would be illusionary to assume that resolving one specific conflict would end all wars and hostilities in the Middle East. Wars have erupted throughout the region regardless of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will continue to do so even if it is solved.

Makovsky and Ross then challenge the neoconservative argument that since the Arab states "categorically reject Israel," "peace is not possible as a result" (p. 91). They treat this as another myth. Egypt and Jordan signed peace [End Page 154] agreements with Israel that have endured through rough periods like the wars in Lebanon, the First and Second Intifadas, and the occasions when Israel took harsh measures against the Palestinians. States like Morocco and some of the Gulf states have also maintained more or less tacit relations with Israel over many years. While the neoconservatives were aware of this, they believed that real peace would come only when the Arabs accepted Israel's moral right to exist—which they are far from doing at the present time. This cannot be the criterion, Makovsky and Ross maintain.

The next myth evolved over "themes of engagement versus non-engagement and regime change versus the change of regime behavior" (p. 9), with Iran as the prime test-case. Ross and Makovsky reject the realists' approach of an engagement that might involve compliance with nuclear Iran, as well as the neocons' idealistic approach that advocates regime change in Iran because it is impossible either to talk with the Iranians or to deter them.

The authors suggest that the United States should aim to influence Iran not by changing the regime, but by changing the behavior of Iran's leaders. That could be done by identifying Iran's vulnerabilities and seeking "to play upon them" (p. 205). At the same time, suggest Ross and Makovsky, the administration should "engage without conditions" (p. 225), that is, initiate talks with the Iranian regime without setting conditions to those talks. Meantime the economic measures would signal to the Iranians that the stick was still hanging over their heads.

While advocating engagement with states like Iran, Makosvky and Ross reject the realists' advocacy of engagement with non-state entities such as Hamas and Hezbollah. These non-state entities, they argue, are much less susceptible to external pressure because they lack...

pdf