The Art of Command in the Civil War (review)

BOOK REVIEWS The Art of Command in the Civil War. Edited by Steven E. Woodworth. (Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 193. $39.95.) Prolific Civil War scholar Steven E. Woodworth collaborated with six other historians to produce this eclectic series of essays, detailing how individual generals on both sides coped with assorted command problems. Woodworth's essay concentrates on much-maligned Braxton Bragg and the 1864 Tullahoma campaign. Woodworth contends that Bragg made sound strategic and tactical decisions but abandoned successive defensive positions because he was undermined by conniving subordinates, wretched cavalry assistance, and his own inability to convey his expectations and plans to subalterns. Unable to cultivate potentially influential opponents within the army and lacking enough clout with Jefferson Davis to eliminate them from his ranks, Bragg had little success with his intra-army enemies, much less the Federals. Craig L. Symonds weighs the relationship between Jefferson Davis, Joseph E. Johnston, and Louis Wigfall, the latter an inveterate foe of Davis. Symonds maintains that Wigfall and Johnston were temperamentally dissimilar but were inextricably bound by a mutual antipathy to Davis. He concludes that Johnston's close ties with Wigfall made a split between Davis and Johnston inevitable. A more collégial relationship between commander and president is defined by Brooks D. Simpson in his study of Ulysses S. Grant's 1864 campaign. Grant envisioned a multi-pronged effort in the East in 1864 but was largely stymied by the failures of various political generals. Grant could not ignore political considerations, particularly the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, and kept pressure on Robert E. Lee despite disappointments elsewhere. Victories by men attuned to his overall vision, principally William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan, vindicated Grant's strategy and secured Lincoln's second term. Grant learned lessons much earlier in the war than 1864, according to William B. Feis. Feis views the November 1861 assault on a Confederate encampment at Belmont, Missouri, as aresult ofGrant's adeptuse ofintelligence. Culling information from a variety of sources and weighing the probable response of his adversaries, Grant assailed Belmont in an effort to clear southeast Missouri of Confedrates. While failing to accomplish this objective, Grant did establish his boldness and resourcefulness. 340CIVIL WAR HISTORY Two other essays involve celebrated Confederates. William J. Miller uses topographical engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss as a model to illustrate how Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson painstakingly assembled a staff of men willing to sublimate their own ambitions for the collective good. By contrast, George Pickett's controversial decision to execute twenty-two deserters at Kingston, North Carolina , in February 1864 is appraised by Donald E. Collins. Collins views Pickett's decision as a response to Robert E. Lee's efforts to stem desertion. While Pickett's draconian measures failed to do so, even within his own division, Collins largely absolves Pickett for his decision to hang the men, who had entered Union service. Philip L. Sherman's intriguing essay assesses efforts by William Rosecrans in 1862 and 1863 to cope with woefully inadequate engineering and topographical resources. Rosecrans met with mixed results in assembling an efficient engineering unit, yet he succeeded remarkably well with his topographical endeavors, primarily because he was blessed with innovative assistants. Taken together, these seven essays underscore how arduous commanding a Civil War army was, and how considerations often neglected by latter-day historians helped shape the decisions and options of commanders on both sides. Christopher Losson St. Joseph, Missouri The Shattering of Texas Unionism: Politics in the Lone Star State during the Civil War Era. By Dale Baum. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999. Pp. xvii, 289. $37.50.) The concept of Unionism in the American South during the Civil War era is an enigma with which historians have wrestled for more than a century. Dale Baum has previously focused on Massachusetts as a case study in Civil War politics. In this work, he turns his attention to party wrangles in Texas before, during, and after the Civil War. In so doing, he focuses on Texas Unionists and finds they are not the cohesive threat many secessionist Democrats wanted Texans to believe they were. In fact, through Baum's work it seems that...