Island No. 10: Struggle for the Mississippi Valley (review)

BOOK REVIEWS77 an enormously valuable enterprise if done correctly, is not only exceedingly difficult in a heavily mined field like the Civil War, but it has also become the favored approach of careerist historians seeking instant fame and those advancing personal ideological agendas. Instead offollowing this treacherous path, the author proposes that historians stick to "setting the record straight" by reexamining the evidence underlying certain events and drawing new conclusions. This task he believes to be "the most important that historical scholarship performs" (33). One does not have to agree with Castel to acknowledge the perceptiveness of his arguments. This volume is vintage Castel. His refreshing and provocative candor packaged within his usual lively prose is guaranteed to entertain and inspire and perhaps to furrow many a brow. But after all, isn't that what historians are supposed to do? William B. Feis Buena Vista University IslandNo. 10: Strugglefor the Mississippi Valley. By Larry J. Daniel and Lynn N. Bock. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 202. $24.95.) In the first book-length study ofthe Island No. 10 campaign, Larry J. Daniel and Lynn N. Bock provide an excellent, detailed description ofthe military activity, analyze the strategy and tactics and contribute to our understanding of the officers in command. Island No. 10, the tenth island in the Mississippi River south of the Ohio River, represented the Confederacy's chief defense against the superior ironclad gunboats of the Union navy. Lacking ironclads, the Confederates relied on fixed fortifications, and the authors set forth that it was only a matter oftime beforejoint Union army-navy operations captured the forts and controlled the rivers. When Gen. John Pope captured Island No. 10 on April 8, 1862, the Battle of Shiloh diverted most of the enemy, giving him a four to one numerical advantage . Nevertheless, Pope was at his best; the authors find his campaign brilliant. Advancing with energy and initiative, he managed logistics efficiently, flanked the island by building a canal through what seemed an impenetrable swamp, and used Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote's gunboats to clear an amphibious landing site of enemy batteries. In seven weeks he captured 4,538 men and 109 guns and opened the Mississippi River practically to Vicksburg—all with less than a hundred casualties. It was such a contrast to George McClellan's slowness and U. S. Grant's losses at Shiloh that Pope's appointment to command in Virginia made sense. However, the weaknesses that caused Pope to fail in the East were evident at Island No. 10—he made ludicrous proposals to department headquarters, inflated the prisoner count, and openly displayed his vanity. The book is well organized and written in a concise and lively style, with many quotations of eyewitnesses on both sides. The authors researched manuscripts 78CIVIL WAR HISTORY and other primary sources including the fifteen newspapers that had correspondents on the scene. The detailed analysis of the artillery is valuable, and the biographical sketches and evaluations ofFoote, Confederate general John R McCown, and the other commanders are interesting and perceptive. A more detailed map of opposing troop movements at the climax of the campaign is needed, and Appendix I should list Foote's fleet as well as the Confederate flotilla of Commodore George N. Hollins. General readers and military historians will enjoy this solid and scholarly study. James A. Ramage Northern Kentucky University Abraham Lincoln and a Nation Worth Fighting For. By James A. Rawley. (Wheeling, 111.: Harlan Davidson, 1996. Pp. xi, 240. $12.95.) If, as has been said, the Civil War was fought over a verb, then this book details how President and Commander in Chief Abraham Lincoln assumed "unprecedented " war powers and turned the verb in the phrase "the United States are" into an is. As Rawley contends, Lincoln achieved his goal of preserving the Union by suspending habeas corpus, raising armies, making war, commanding egotistical generals, recommending strategy, emancipating slaves, arming African American soldiers, and instituting reconstruction policies. But these extraordinary actions, Rawley argues, were not undertaken by Lincoln to establish an "imperial presidency." They were necessitated by the exigencies of a civil war that Lincoln was determined to win. And Lincoln, aware that...