Davis and Lee at War (review)

BOOK REVIEWS75 Davis and Lee at War. By Steven E. Woodworth. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Pp. xiv, 410. $29.95.) There were "two viable methods by which the Confederacy might have won its independence," Steven Woodworth argues in Davis andLee at War, the Virginia theater companion to his Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (1990). They were a "largely offensive grand strategy," favored by Robert E. Lee, and a "thoroughly defensive, survivaloriented " one, championed by Davis. "The trouble," says Woodworth, "was that neitherwas . . . pursued," at leastnot consistently, primarily because of'Davis's inability to find and direct generals in such a way that they would carry out his ideas" (xii, 327, 330). Davis would have disagreed. He termed his strategy the "offensive-defensive " in his memoirs (2:132), a concept endorsed and expounded on by Frank Vandiver. Instead of directing generals to carry out his ideas, Davis told them that "my design is to suggest not to direct," with his intimations generally advocating aggressive action. He bristled at talk that he favored the defensive, replying to such a statement in 1862 that he had "never . . . preferred defensive war, but rather pined for the day when our soil should be free from invasion and our banners float over the fields of the Enemy" (The Papers ofJefferson Davis 8:185, 294'. see also 8:567). The Confederate president would have been incensed at Woodworth's contention that the ever-retreating Joseph E. Johnston held a strategic outlook "very similar" to his own (97). For unexplained reasons, half of the book is devoted to Johnston and the first year of the war (with an overreliance on Steven Newton's dissertation, cited forty-three times in chapter 4 alone). When Lee finally does take command, Woodworth paints his approach as "aggressive, audacious, and aimed at a quick victory" (330). Contrary to Archer Jones's belief that Lee operated on the strategic defensive, even when on what Jones terms "raids" into the North, Woodworth asserts that the northern forays were indeed "invasions," with the Gettysburg campaign "an all-out, end-the-war gamble" (188, 234, 239). This claim, however, is not reconciled with Lee's April 1863 statement that he did not expect the war to end until after the 1864 elections. Lee later noted that "in crossing the Potomac I did not propose to invade the North, for I did not believe that the Army ofNorthern Virginia was strong enough for the purpose" (Southem Historical Society Papers 7:445). Davis and Lee did differ, especially over stripping troops from parts of the Confederacy for a concentrated advance, but Lee accepted the limitations that Davis felt politics necessitated and still found ways to act aggressively—precisely the way Davis longed for Johnston and Braxton Bragg to operate. Instead of being "at war" with each other, as the double entendre title suggests, Davis and Lee had one of the most harmonious and fruitful relationships of the conflict. 76CIVIL WAR HISTORY Woodworth has produced a lively and readable narrative account ofa topic in need of exploration, but his analysis is not corroborated with enough evidence, certainly not the documentation one should have when challenging the likes of Frank Vandiver and Archer Jones. Further examination—and explanation—is still needed. Kenneth H. Williams The Papers ofJefferson Davis Rice University Winning and Losing in the Civil War: Essays and Stories. By Albert Castel. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. Pp. xii, 204. $29.95.) Although most readers are familiar with Albert Castel through his numerous monographs, in particular his prize-winning (and deservedly so) work Decision in the West (1992), his latest contribution also deserves a place on the sagging bookshelves ofboth Civil War scholars and buffs. Culled from numerous articles and essays written during Castel's fruitful career, Winning and Losing in the Civil Warcombines in one volume insightful and diverse pieces that range from a discussion of how the North almost lost the Civil War to an interesting look at that unsung hero in American military history, the Army mule. As with the author's earlier works, readers will not be disappointed with this collection. To lend...