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BOOK REVIEWS79 based upon a blend of primary accounts and the latest scholarship in the field. Throughout Banking in the American South, the author is enlightening and challenging. He modifies Peter Temin's assessment of the Panic of 1837, takes issue occasionally with Bray Hammond, feels that Southern banking was not a colonial appendage to that of the North, believes that Southern banks provided sufficient capital to support Southern industrial development (had the region chosen to industrialize), finds that Southern banks fairly easily weathered the Panic of 1857, and contends that on the eve of the Civil War banking was sound in the Old South states and improving in most of those of the New South. The title is somewhat misleading, for this is not simply an institutional history of banking but also a consideration of the bankers as people, men who were not subservient to the planters or pawns in a slave-owning society, and men who generally were loyal to the Confederacy regardless of their convictions before secession. Despite the contributions of Schweikart, some caveats must be lodged. Too often, poor sentence structure undermines the effectiveness of his arguments. Citations are not as plentiful or as complete in some cases as might be desired. The index is suspect—despite references to such an important subject as "counterfeiting," that term fails to find a place in the index. A consideration of the Subtreasury and its impact on Southern banking is altogether missing. The typological distinction between the Old South states and the New South states (with which Schweikart seems more familiar) appears suspect on occasion. Nevertheless, given the scope of this work, it is a valuable addition to the literature of the antebellum South and banking in America. Alan D. Watson University of North Carolina at Wilmington The Presidency of James K. Polk. By Paul H. Bergeron. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. Pp. 310. $25.00.) The Mexican War era has elicited a galvanic response from recent historians. Irresistible issues, an expansive foreign policy, the question of democracy and empire, an emergent Hispanic population, a compulsive president and superpower relationships have reminded Americans since the 1960s of the increasing relevance of the 1840s. Yet if the crises of that latter decade have attracted the attention of scholars, the role of James K. Polk has remained more elusive. That void has finally been filled by Paul Bergeron. Polk emerges as an aggressive, activist chief executive, a man who exercised control over his political world. After choosing a competent cabinet, he held twice-weekly meetings with them and kept a watchful 80CTVTL WAR HISTORY eye on their activities. While stability and mutual respect marked relations with his cabinet, the Tennesseean—pledged to a single term—feared "presidential fevers" among his lieutenants. Secretary of State James Buchanan, with whom Polk often disagreed, became a source of frequent irritation. In foreign affairs, Bergeron rejects the notion that Polk served as the architect of the Mexican War. In detailing White House policy, the author sees Polk tapping "a nationalistic desire for expansion" already existent among the press and the populace. Bergeron admits that the president coveted California and the Southwest; however, he contends (in contrast to more imperially-minded historians) that Polk defensively backed into a conflict that was perhaps unavoidable. The same combination of forces operated in the Oregon crisis, but this time Polk played a high stakes diplomatic game with a major European power and won without force. Bergeron allows that the president , who possessed an "inclination toward disingenuousness," paid a heavy price in his relationship with Congress and the British. In domestic affairs the administration set its sights on reducing the tariff, reestablishing the Independent Treasury, and limiting federal funding for internal improvements. Successful in each area, Polk encountered difficulty only on the partisan tariff issue. Bergeron's Polk is a leader. While the author may rate Polk's relations with the press and his patronage activities as "mixed," clearly the tireless, seemingly obsessive-compulsive president achieved his goals. Only the issue of slavery in the territories left him hesitant and indecisive. Polk's belated (1848) endorsement of an extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific was ill...

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