McClellan and the Peace Plank of 1864: A Reappraisal

McClellan and the Peace Plank of 1864: A Reappraisal Stephen W. Sears Historians today treat George B. McClellan, presidential candidate, with scant respect. This is particularly evident in their analyses of McClellan's acceptance of the Democratic nomination. When on August 31, 1864, the Chicago convention chose the general to head its ticket, it presented him with a platform containing a plank terming the Northern war effort a failure and calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Confronted by this so-called peace plank, James A. Rawley writes, McClellan "weakly vacillated over his acceptance letter." Jean H. Baker remarks his "uncertainty about the platform." The general's first reaction, according to Larry E. Nelson, was to consider "offering the South an unconditional armistice and unrestricted peace talks." In Joel H. Silbey's account, "McClellan wavered, for a time, as to what to do"; in William F. Zornow's, he wavered and "shifted his ground twice." James M. McPherson explains that initially McClellan "endorsed an armistice qualified only by a proviso calling for renewal of the war if negotiations failed to produce reunion," an action that "would have satisfied" the peace plank's author, Clement L. Vallandigham.1 Although in the end McClellan's letter accepting the Democratic nomination did not embrace the idea of an unconditional armistice, thus rejecting Vallandigham's peace plank, the picture of the general in the ' Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United States of America, During the Great Rebellion 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Philp & Solomons, 1865), 419; James A. Rawley, The Politics of Union: Northern Politics during the Civil War (1974; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 160; Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, ?.?.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 285n; Larry E. Nelson, Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policyfor the United States Presidential Contest of 1864 (University: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 121; Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 135; William Frank Zornow, Lincoln & the Party Divided (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 136; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 775. Civil War History, Vol. XXXVl, No. 1, ° 1990 by the Kent State University Press 58erra WAR HISTORY throes of indecision has persisted. It suggests that this trait so marked in him on the battlefield also marked him as a presidential candidate. It suggests as well that President Lincoln was remarkably prescient in characterizing General McClellan when he wrote in his famous "blind memorandum" of August 23 that he expected to be defeated if McClellan was nominated, and in that event the cabinet must join him "to save the Union between the election and the inauguration" for his opponent "will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards."2 To those aware of McClellan's vacillation over the peace plank in the platform, it seemed a sure forecast of future vacillation over the paramount issues of peace and reunion had he gained the presidency. The outcome of the 1864 election takes on even greater significance thereby. The unflattering appraisal of candidate McClellan by these historians is perfectly understandable, for all of them utilized the same source in describing the general's agonizing experience composing his acceptance letter. This much-cited source is Charles R. Wilson's article "McClellan's Changing Views on the Peace Plank of 1864," published in the American Historical Review in 1933. Making use for the first time of documents on the 1864 presidential contest in the McClellan Papers deposited in the Library of Congress, Professor Wilson, of the University of Cincinnati , called into question the then-current interpretation that in his acceptance of the Democratic nomination "the general at no time wavered in his 'Union at any price' position." Documents in the McClellan Papers, Wilson wrote, "throw doubt upon the validity of this assumption."3 Wilson grounded his argument in what he described as four early drafts by McClellan of his acceptance letter. Previous to the convention, the general had seemed entirely consistent in...