Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland (review)

BOOK REVIEWS357 Instead, as this superb book demonstrates, Pickett's Charge was but an epilogue to the decisive events of the second day. Peter Maslowski University of Nebraska at Lincoln Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland. By Benjamin Franklin Cooling. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1987. Pp. xiv, 354. $24.95.) In his book Forts Henry and Donelson, Benjamin Franklin Cooling argues not only that the fall of those two Confederate defensive positions opened the door to Union conquest ofthe South's "heartland,"but also that the engagements represented one of the most important turning points of the Civil War. He claims that the veterans of the battles downplayed the significance of the campaign and that most historians have "perpetuated the amnesia about the meaning of Henry-Donelson" (p. xiii). Cooling decries those portrayals of the battles "as minor affairs, a merepreludeto Shiloh and beyond" (p. xiii). Heclearly believes thatthe Confederate loss at Henry and Donelson "started a domino effect" and led to "ultimate suppression of the Confederacy" (pp. 276, 277). The general story of Henry and Donelson should be familiar to most readers. To protect the water passages into Tennessee and the South's "heartland," Confederate troops constructed two earthworks—Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River. Kentucky's neutrality early in the conflict dictated poor siteselections for the forts, but even after the Bluegrass State's declaration for the Union, the Confederates made no attempt to erect defenses or to station troops at better positions along the rivers. Work on the two forts progressed slowly because no one recognized the potential threat to the area, and because of conflicts between commanders and engineers on the scene. Henry, in particular, stood little chance of withstanding a strong enemy attack from either land or water. Union land and naval forces under Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote began a campaign against the two forts in early February 1862. Cooling states that no one really knows who in the Union high command was responsible for suggesting the campaign . He concludes that "the rivers approach for breaching the Rebel defense line in the West was common knowledge in the West at the end of 1861" (p. 66). According to Cooling, once the Confederates realized the threat, they did not react appropriately but took a passiverather than aggressive tactical approach. They made no effort to concentrate their troops and attack Grant's untried foot soldiers as they neared their objective . Foote's gunboats attacked Henry on February 6, 1862, before the infantry could come up. Confederate cannon fire did great damage to 358CIVIL WAR history the Federal vessels and was about to force them to retreat "when a succession of catastrophes happened in the fort that restored the confidence and advance of the flotilla" (p. 106). Losing the use of their most effective cannons, the Confederates had to surrender after a fight of only an hour and twenty minutes. The quick capture of Henry created something of a panic in the Confederate command in the western theater. Cooling argues that cooler heads would have recognized the fact that "a determined counteroffensive " against Grant's men after the fall of Henry could have destroyed his army since his men had their backs to a swollen river and since Foote's gunboats had left the area to undergo repairs. Failing that, the Confederates could have concentrated enough men near Donelson to blunt Grant's subsequent move against that place, and they might still have smashed the Union army. Instead of acting aggressively, General Albert Sidney Johnston became obsessed with withdrawing his forces and supplies from Bowling Green to Nashville. Cooling accuses Johnston of abandoning his responsibilities as theater commander by allowing subordinates to make strategic decisions and to fight "the major battle in the West" without him (pp. 128, 243). The author states that Johnston always sought "someone else to make decisions and provide leadership" (p. 244). Grant's reinforced army marched overland from Henry toward Donelson . There some 15,000 to 20,000 Confederates awaited the approach of the 25,000 Federals. Fighting near the land defenses began...