The Battle of New Market (review)

88CIVIL WAR HISTORY has been fully laid to rest among historians for nearly a quartercentury . In addition, for an author who begins by declaring how many common errors he will destroy, he falls victim to a significant number of them. For example, he accepts that the Knights of the Golden Circle were subversive in nature, despite continuing evidence to the contrary by Frank Klement. Furthermore, he insists upon the use—and in some cases the creation—of arbitrary and misleading categorical labels. War Democrats shift in mid-conflict into Peace Democrats. "Antebellum Peace Democrats" become "Proto-War Democrats." Etc., etc. The delicate balance of ideology, partisanship , patriotism, prejudice, hope and fear that determined any American's feelings regarding the shattering events of the 1860's does not admit of such facile categorization. In fact, such labeling enforces a simplicity upon the subject that just did not exist. Most unfortunate is that Dell falls into a variation of the all too familiar "Lincoln won the war and saved the nation" theme. Concomitant with this is the assumption that the "Peace" Democrats were traitorous, by definition. The 1864 elections were won, Dell says, only with the support of the "loyal War Democracy," a statement that implies that Democrats not voting the Union ticket were not loyal. Dell also believes that the Union party was no mere Republican facade but rather "all that it claimed to be," that is, a true cooperative, nonpartisan movement. The credit for this remarkable coalition, Dell claims, goes to Lincoln, who by "gentle hammering " destroyed the "conservative principles" of the Northern Democracy (p. 309). Dell has surveyed an extremely interesting and important political group in the War Democrats. He is correct in that purely in terms of historical writing they have been somewhat obscured by studies of either the Republicans per se or of the "Copperheads." The War Democrats still deserve a lucid and careful book-length treatment. Eric J. Cardinal Kent State University The Battle of New Market. By William C. Davis. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975. Pp. xiv, 249. $8.95.) What modern Civil War historiography needs is sound, scholarly studies of individual campaigns and battles—the principal elements, after all, that made up the war. One such recent study is William C. Davis's The Battle of New Market, covering the entire campaign beginning in late March, 1864, and culminating in the little but decisive battle of New Market, May 15. The general outline of operations is well known: how Sigel's small Union force was brilliantly outmaneuvered, strategically and tactically, by Breckinridge's even BOOK REVIEWS89 smaller Confederate force and sent streaming down the Shenandoah Valley in defeat, due largely, according to tradition, to the valorous efforts of the V.M.I, cadet battalion. To this familiar outline, Davis adds great richness of detail, derived from thorough use of published and manuscript sources. Indeed, his diligence in locating and utilizing such papers, some still in private hands, is one of the book's strong points. Another major contribution is the perceptiveness and judiciousness of most of his judgments. He not merely asserts but establishes the incompetence of Sigel and his ranking subordinates; he not only heralds but demonstrates the ability of Breckinridge and his officers and men. At the same time he revises other truisms and offers new interpretations. His splendid account of the battle itself is especially full of such refinements. He fully credits the cadets' achievements yet conclusively shows that they deserve neither sole nor decisive credit for the victory. He also convincingly argues that the turning point came not around Bushong's yard but along the Valley Pike. And he impressively dispels old uncertainties about strength and casualties. All this—interpretation, assessment, narrative, statistics—are, moreover, expressed in a style particularly felicitous. The book is, admittedly, not without error. Most of the few mistakes concern background events occurring before or after the campaign . One error, however, pertains to the operation, the misstatement that "Lee's authority did not encompass . . . Imboden," May 1. The Valley District, in fact, always belonged to the Department of Northern Virginia. One also questions Davis's apparent acceptance of the accuracy of Confederate fears that the...