Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition (review)

BOOK REVIEWS87 Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition. By Christopher Dell. (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975. Pp. 455. $18.50.) This book is based upon two basic contentions—the by now familiar one that Lincoln was not really a conservative, but in fact a radical in sheep's clothing; and that Lincoln and his political followers could not have won the war without the support of significant numbers of the Democracy. Dell also claims that those Democrats who sustained the President themselves became radicalized and thus agents of reform after the war. There are a series of basic problems that result from these underlying contentions. The first of these is that Dell has forced upon these points the old, but book-selling theme of "Lincoln and . . ." which causes him to overstate his case and to distort the relationship between the President and the Democracy. For one thing, he ascribes Democratic cooperation with the war effort almost entirely to the action of Lincoln. "Abraham Lincoln was the Pied Piper of Civil War politics who lured unwary Democrats with Conservative phraseology and radical intent," are the words with which he commences the book. So mesmerizing was Lincoln, he asserts, that the War Democracy "agreed to fight against its own instinct and prejudice." At the war's end the Democratic party lay in shambles, "exposed," Dell concludes, as the "fanatical protector of the cotton interests and the Judas of Jeffersonian idealism" (p. 9). The shallowness of view thus exposed, even when allowances are made for the hyperbolic writing of introductions generally, makes no recognition of the legitimacy (not to mention the complexity) of the Democratic ideology. But this inauspicious beginning only presages what is on the whole a mediocre book. Dell combines a series of semantic and substantive misconceptions with his zeal to emphasize the role of Lincoln to create wholesale distortions concerning the Northern Democracy, and Civil War politics in general. For example, Northern Democrats who advocated conciliation with the South during the secession crisis— whom he labels the "Antebellum Peace Democrats"—did so, Dell believes, because of their "hatred of the Republican party," rather than "love for the Union" (p. 31). Other errors abound. Stephen A. Douglas is condemned for his conduct during the secession crisis, for spending his time "carping," and for having "nothing to offer" as a positive plan of action, and for having "even less to say against Secession" (p. 32). He asserts that one area of strength of the Peace Democracy was the southern counties of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois (p. 33), a misconception first shattered over thirty years ago by John Stipp ("Economic and Political Aspects of Western Copperheadism," Ph.D. Diss., Ohio State, 1944), and one that 88CIVIL WAR HISTORY has been fully laid to rest among historians for nearly a quartercentury . In addition, for an author who begins by declaring how many common errors he will destroy, he falls victim to a significant number of them. For example, he accepts that the Knights of the Golden Circle were subversive in nature, despite continuing evidence to the contrary by Frank Klement. Furthermore, he insists upon the use—and in some cases the creation—of arbitrary and misleading categorical labels. War Democrats shift in mid-conflict into Peace Democrats. "Antebellum Peace Democrats" become "Proto-War Democrats." Etc., etc. The delicate balance of ideology, partisanship , patriotism, prejudice, hope and fear that determined any American's feelings regarding the shattering events of the 1860's does not admit of such facile categorization. In fact, such labeling enforces a simplicity upon the subject that just did not exist. Most unfortunate is that Dell falls into a variation of the all too familiar "Lincoln won the war and saved the nation" theme. Concomitant with this is the assumption that the "Peace" Democrats were traitorous, by definition. The 1864 elections were won, Dell says, only with the support of the "loyal War Democracy," a statement that implies that Democrats not voting the Union ticket were not loyal. Dell also believes that the Union party was no mere Republican facade but rather "all that it claimed to be," that is, a true cooperative, nonpartisan movement. The...