Gabriel García y Tassara and the American Civil War: A Spanish Perspective

GABRIEL GARCIA Y TASSARA AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A Spanish Perspective Kinley J. Brauer During the American Civil War, Spanish-American relations were remarkably harmonious. In June, 1861, the Spanish government issued its Proclamation of Neutrality, typically after England and France had issued theirs, and between 1861 and 1865, Spain never wavered in its official program of friendship with the government in Washington. By following England and France, the Spanish avoided the controversy over the "premature" recognition of Southern belligerency that embittered Anglo-American relations, and in adhering to a rigorous definition of neutrality, though not always satisfactory to the American government , Spain avoided a number of conflicts arising out of Confederate naval activities. With the exception of Spanish policies in Santo Domingo , the United States had relatively few complaints with Spain's course during the war years. Partly because there were no major crises in Spanish-American relations during the war and partly because Spain played a distinctlysecondary role in Europe's relations with the United States, little has been published in English on the relations between the two countries between 1861 and 1865. In addition to a short chapter in Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt's study of Spanish "public opinion" in Europe and the American Civil War and a few articles based on American and British sources dealing with specific events, the only detailed considerations of Spanish-American relations in this period relate to the Spanish re-annexation of the Dominican Republic. Dexter Perkins has focused on the Spanish challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, and Charles Tansill and Rayford Logan have considered Spanish policies in their studies of the relations of the United States with the Dominican Republic and Haiti.1 Neither Ephraim D. Adams nor Lynn ' See Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt, Europe and the American Civil War (Boston, 1931), pp. 245-56; Charles C. Hauch, "Attitudes of Foreign Governments Toward the Spanish Reoccupation of the Dominican Republic," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVII (May, 1947), 247-68; Clifford L. Egan, "Friction in New Orleans: General Butler versus the Spanish Consul," Louisiana HLitory, IX (Winter, 1968), 43-52 and "A Note on Spanish-Peruvian Problems in American Diplomacy," Lincoln Herald, LXIX (Fall, 1967), 116-20; Barbara Donner, "Carl Schurz the Diplomat ," Wisconsin Magazine of Hiitory, XX (Mar., 1937), 291-309; Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 253-317; Charles C. Tansill, The g CIVIL WAR HISTORY M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, in their definitive studies of AngloAmerican and Franco-American wartime relations, used Spanish materials or referred to Spain more than a few times; Glyndon G. Van Deusen mentions Spain twice in his biography of Seward.2 Yet, of these three Atlantic powers, Spain was as interested in American affairs, the most vulnerable to the United States, and at least equally concerned with the development and outcome of the American crisis. Spain's policy toward the United States during the Civil War was largely the product of indecision. Throughout the war, Leopoldo O'Donnell and his successors as Minister of State were buffeted by conflicting advice on how best to deal with the American situation, and Spain's coalition governments were comprised of individuals whose attitudes toward the United States, the Union and Confederate causes, and the portent of the American division covered a wide spectrum. Some advisors, such as Francisco Serrano y Domínguez, the captaingeneral of Cuba until 1863, urged active support for the slave South; others, such as Serrano's rival Juan Prim y Prats, expressed sympathy for the republican North. Some saw the LJnited States, divided or whole, as a continuing menace to Spain; others suggested that American power had been irreparably destroyed and even welcomed a SpanishAmerican war. Finally, there were a great many who vacillated between these extremes and regarded Spain's future role vis-a-vis the LJnited States with alternating moods of optimism and pessimism. Given the disparity of advice and evaluations received by the Spanish government, its logical program would have been to make no initiatives, to watch carefully the evolution of American affairs, and to adjust United States and Santo Domingo. 1798-1873: A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy (Baltimore...